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SUMMARY
Land has been the revolutionary metaphor for wealth and power in the world
and even more so in Africa. Ideally, land reform in Africa should therefore,
contribute to social and economic progress and ultimately result in social
equity as well as increased agricultural productivity.
This study was devoted to the history of colonialism and the meaning and
birth of land reform policies after colonialism. Moreover, to familiarise the
reader with the various meanings and issues concerning land reform
particularly in Kenya and Zimbabwe. The outcome of the study was to
provoke further discussion on the need for land reform in other developing
countries, especially South Africa, as well as to investigate whether
colonialism created certain land ownership patterns that had harmful effects
on the political and economic climate after independence in Kenya and
Zimbabwe.
Kenya has been unable to establish a sustainable land reform programme
since independence. Ethnic clashes in the early 1990's were seen as a
continuation of a battle to recognise the existence of property rights. The
contributing factor to the conflict was the fact that the political leadership in
Kenya was the direct beneficiary of land reform policies. Furthermore, the
uncontrolled privatisation of public land only resulted in economic and
agricultural decay. The Kenyan experience provides no evidence of increase
in agricultural production, but inevitably resulted in social and economic
inequalities and the emergence of significant landlessness, which was a result
of the inadequacy of government, to provide credit as was initially proposed.
Zimbabwe faces the painful reality that its political revolutions have only
brought them halfway to true independence. The objective for Zimbabwe was
to establish a functional socialist economy where decision making would be
under political control in order to bring about the drastic redistribution of
wealth from whites to blacks and to become independent form capitalists.
The importance of land in Zimbabwe did not so much lie in the social and
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economic inequalities, but rather the inability to access land, accompanied by
a growing overpopulation, landlessness, land deterioration and escalating
poverty in the black areas parallel with severe under-utilisation of land in the
white farming areas.
This study concludes that African governmental land reform programmes
have had mixed success. The complex nature of the liberation struggles in
Africa, created diverse post-independence governmental systems. However,
some former colonies illustrate certain common underlying issues such as the
fact that years after independence, land remains one of the key unresolved
issues in both Kenya and Zimbabwe, as well as in South Africa.
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vOPSOMMING
Gesien in die lig dat grond die revolusionêre metafoor van rykdom en mag in
die wêreld, nog te meer in Afrika is, sal dit ideaal wees indien
grondhervorming in Afrika kan bydra tot sosiale en ekonomiese bevordering
en uiteindelik kan uitloop in sosiale gelykheid asook toename in landbou
produktiwiteit.
Hierdie studie was toegewyaan die geskiedenis van kolonialisme en die
betekenis en oorsprong van grondhervormingsbeleide na kolonialisme, asook
om die leser in te lig oor menings en uitgangspunte rakende
grondhervorming, spesifiek in Kenya en Zimbabwe. Die doel van die studie
was om verdere besprekings oor die behoefte vir grondhervorming in ander
ontwikkelende lande, veral Suid-Afrika, uit te lok. Verder om te ondersoek of
kolonialisme sekere grondeienaarskappatrone veroorsaak het wat negatiewe
effekte op die politieke en ekonomiese klimaat in Kenya en Zimbabwe, na
onafhanklikheidswording, veroorsaak het.
Kenya is, sedert onafhanklikheidswording, nog nie in staat om 'n volhoudbare
grondhervormingsprogram daar te stel nie. Etniese botsings in die vroeë
1990's was gesien as 'n voortsetting van 'n geveg om die bestaan van
eiendomsregte te erken. Die bydraende faktor tot die konflik was die feit dat
die politieke leierskap in Kenya direkte begunstigdes van die
grondhervormingsbeleide was. Verder het onbeheerde privatisering van
openbare grond ekonomiese en landbou verval tot gevolg gehad. Die Kenya-
ondervinding voorsien geen bewyse van toename in landbou produktiwiteit
nie, maar het onvermydelik sosiale en ekonomiese ongelykhede en die
ontstaan van merkwaardige grondloosheid tot gevolg gehad as gevolg van die
onvermoeë van die regering om krediet te voorsien soos aanvanklik
voorgestel was.
Zimbabwe staar die pynlike realiteit in die oë dat hul politieke revolusies hulle
slegs halfpad tot ware onafhanklikheid gebring het. Die doel vir Zimbabwe
was om 'n funksionele sosialistiese ekonomie daar te stel waar besluitneming
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onder politieke beheer sou wees om sodanig drastiese herverdeling van
rykdom vanaf blankes na swartes, asook onafhanklikheid van kapitaliste, te
bewerkstellig. Die belangrikheid van grond het nie soveel in die sosiale en
ekonomiese ongelykhede gelê nie, maar liewer in die onvermoë om grond te
bekom tesame met "n toenemende oorbevolking, grondloosheid,
grondverarming en toenemende armoede in swart gebiede. 'n Bydraende
faktor was die uiterse onderbenutting van grond in blanke boerdery gebiede.
In samevatting wys hierdie studie dat grondhervormingsprogramme van
regerings in Afrika gemengde sukses behaal het. Die kompleksiteit van die
bevrydingstryde in Afrika het uiteenlopende post-onafhanklike regeringstelsels
tot stand gebring. Nietemin, illustreer somige voormalige kolonies sekere
algemene onderliggende uitgangspunte, onder andere die feit dat grond, jare
na onafhanklikheid, steeds een van die belangrikste onopgeloste vraagstukke
in beide Kenya en Zimbabwe, sowel as Suid-Afrika is.
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1CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 PROBLEM STA TEMENT
In Africa the struggle for land has been a major factor in decolonisation and
post-independence development. The fight for land between tribes and
nations and between settlers and indigenous populations represent a
significant chapter in Africa's recent history. Land became a resource whose
value was determined by the sacrifices in blood made in order to take or
protect it. The current land patterns in Africa were shaped by land
dispossession initiated by colonialism and large-scale immigration by
European settlers into Africa, which determined the economic position of
Africans.
Bracewell-Milnes (1982: 17) stated that ownership represents potential
consumption, and that the power to consume has value as well as its
exercise. This links with the most pressing concerns for indigenous
communities the world over: the use of land and the occupation thereof. To
them the relationship to land was not merely a question of possession and
production but also a material and spiritual element that must be fully
preserved for future generations.
Arnold (1974: 35) argued that colonialism should be looked at for exactly what
it was designed to do i.e. to benefit the colonial powers financially. Therefore,
it could be stated that colonial practices were created to put a divide between
the ruled and the rulers. While colonial subjects had the rights in theory, in
practice these rights were severely limited. Colonialism worked upon a series
of balanced theories: "divide and rule; concede and hold; loyalty and
subversion" (Arnold, 1974: 42). De Waal (1990: 17) stated that colonialism
was a word, which was exclusively used by those who have been colonised,
while the colonial powers justified their exploitation as a moral obligation to
civilisation. Furthermore, Arnold (1974: 46) reported that even to the end of
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colonialism, the colonial authorities still believed that they knew what was best
for Africans, and this insistence upon superior wisdom more than any was
what made colonialism so unbearable to its subjects. This created a divide
that gave birth to the theory of backward and advanced communities in the
colony. Horowitz (1985: 50) stated that every population group needs a
positive self-evaluation and that differences between various groups create
comparisons and competition, subsequently creating greater chances for
conflict.
Imbalances of land ownership in Africa dates back to the Berlin Conference of
1885, when European powers partitioned Africa into spheres of influence. De
Waal (1990: 15) stated that during the Berlin Conference agreement was that
Europe would "emphatically pledged themselves and placed on record their
recognition of the sacred duty of preserving the aboriginal races of Africa; of
watching over their interests; and of cultivating their moral and material
advancement and development". The reality was that Black Africa was
dispossessed of its ancestral lands and prohibited from participating in
commercial production except as labourers and at the end of the First World
War Europe had colonised up to 85% of the world. Since then 'the land
question' became a major cause of liberation struggle in Africa. Land reform
(must be noted) was a recurrent historical event and not merely the invention
of idealistic reformers. Years after most countries have regained their
independence these imbalances still remain, as in the case of Kenya and
Zimbabwe, with one or another being forced into dominance by historical and
political circumstances.
In Africa we have seen that the best cultivable land had been owned and
operated by colonial settlers and the decolonisation process, therefore, had
implications for the relations of production in the agrarian system of these
countries. For the purpose of this study it was decided to focus on two African
countries whose land reform policies received the most attention. Kenya and
Zimbabwe are examples of countries, which were both under British Colonial
Rule, where dispossession took place and where the struggle for land fuelled
the liberation struggle. There was no doubt that one of the greatest problems
2
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1.1.1 Kenya
of development in Africa was how to adjust "tradition-ridden societies to the
requirements of agricultural progress and socio-economic advance and how
to finally decide whether to channel this dynamic process to the advantage of
all Africans or leave it to favour just a few" (Jacoby, 1971: 319).
Kenya and Zimbabwe are two countries with various similarities and
differences regarding land reform and restitution. In both cases the quest for
land ownership was pivotal in the political evolution of these countries.
Today, perhaps more than ever, people in developing countries are living in
need of land.
Kenya is regarded as a rural economy and for this reason land reform plays
an integral role in the overall economic strategy. Kenya is a country with a
land area of 570,000 square kilometers, and underdeveloped in nature. The
vast majority of Kenya's population "(85-90%) is rural" (Hunt, 1984: 8). Most
of the people in turn derive all or part of their income from the land. Kenya
has most of the problems associated with poverty: "low levels of education,
poor nutrition, weak health care, poor infrastructure, and over-reliance on
agriculture" (McCormick, 2001: 5). It is not surprising that Kenya rank "18ih
out of 210 countries in GOP per capita" (McCormick, 2001: 5). Between 1980
and 2000, Kenya's labour force grew significantly from 7,2 million to 14,8
million. Inevitably, the majority of the new labour force will seek employment
in the rural sector and while land is unequally distributed, overall population
pressure on the land is rising rapidly. Hunt (1984: 9) emphasis that the
present systems of land holding and land use in Kenya is a legacy of both the
pre-colonial and colonial (1895-1963) periods.
During the colonial period the indigenous tribes were restricted to reserves,
while the settler community cultivated the arable land in Kenya. The land was
reserved for white settlement and the exclusion of the indigenous population
from what were "deemed to be their ancestral lands has triggered off the Mau
3
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Mau rebellion of the 1950's" (Sobhan, 1993: 72). During this period colonial
authorities introduced programmes of land reform in the reserves. It was
initiated in the "Kikuyu province, and continued after independence in other
parts of the country" (Hunt, 1984: 12). In 1968 Jomo Kenyatta was reported
stating, "[the] greatest asset in Kenya is [the] land, which is the heritage
received from our forefathers and in land lays our salvation and survival"
(Klopp, 2000: 7).
During the process of negotiations for independence it was agreed, with the
exception of the settler community, that a substantial proportion of settler
farms would be transferred to African ownership. This was viewed essential
to maintain political and economic stability, as land reforms were associated
with a process of overall social, political and economic transformations. The
aim of the Kenyan government was to acquire the surplus land from the white
settlers for redistributive purposes to African households. However, the
government also wanted "white settlers to continue to run their capitalist
farms, which remained the main source of production and exports from the
farm sector" (Sobhan, 1993: 73). Some farms were transferred to members
of the new political elite and other sections were subdivided into settlement
schemes. Hunt (1984: 13) reports that the Kenyan land reform programme
was financed by loans from the World Bank and the British Government and
the core of the Kenyan land transfer process, "which continued till 1971, was
the Million-Acre Scheme for which US$42 million was provided" (UF research,
1993: 3). It was agreed between the various parties that purchases would be
made at the prevailing market price, on a willing seller basis.
Since political independence in 1963, Kenya boasted with the "highest per
capita income in East Africa and the largest most diversified modern sector"
(Hunt, 1984: 19) but the extremes of income were marked and associated
with differences in race. A decade later signs of instability crept in as Kenya
was still relying heavily on its agricultural sector. The Kenyan government
was confronted with the question if whether they can maintain to promote
equity by redistribution programmes with high population pressures and a
large landless labour force.
4
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5Two possible policy alternatives regarding land distribution were suggested;
first to redistribute land to individual peasant producers and with the
continuing dominance of private ownership. Secondly, to establish a stable
ownership of large-scale industry and collective ownership of cultivable land.
During this time many believed that the only way to readdress poverty and to
provide optimal employment and income opportunities was through radical
asset and land redistribution.
1.1.2 Zimbabwe
More than 20 years after Zimbabwe attained its independence the land
question has continued to dominate the political arena. Land in Africa has
been a central issue ever since the coming of the colonists and in Zimbabwe it
remained a key determinant, which shaped the entire political economy.
Colonialism in Zimbabwe began in "1889, [driven by] the British South Africa
Company (BSAC) under Cecil Rhodes" (Peters & Malan, 2000: 151). Today
some of the key issues of public concern in Zimbabwe include: "the adequacy
of the quantity and quality of land redistributed, the method and costs of land
acquisition and redistribution, the efficiency of land use in both the large farm
and resettlement areas, the suitability of those benefiting from land
redistribution, the fairness and equitability of procedures for dealing with land
demands, and the economic impact of land reform" (Moyo, 1995: 1). In
Zimbabwe land reform embraced a variety of policy problems ranging from
political, economic, social and environmental issues. The term land reform
had many different meanings to various interests groups over time in
Zimbabwe and subsequently, had an impact on the success and deliverance
rate of the various land reform programmes.
The unequal distribution of land was due to legislation drawn up by the
colonial powers to favour settlers politically and economically. By the end of
"1910, 23,4 % of the land had been appropriated by whites, and 26 % had
been declared Native Reserves, later to become known as Tribal Trust Lands"
(Herbst, 1991: 269). The implementation of The Land Apportionment Act
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6(LAA) in 1930 legalised the division of the country's land. By this time,
Europeans owned 50,8 %, Natives 30,1 % and the rest 19,1%, furthermore,
this "act prohibited members of either racial group from owning land in areas
assigned to the other" (Herbst, 1991: 269). Thus, creating large inequalities
concerning the quality of land held by the different racial groups. Herbst
(1991: 269) reported that 74 % of all peasant land was in areas frequented by
droughts and uneven rainfall, which made intensive crop production
impossible. Moreover, the population density in the reserves/communal areas
"where approximately 28 people per square kilometer compared to the only
nine people per square kilometer in the white areas" (Herbst, 1991: 270). The
racially discriminatory act of grouping indigenous tribes in reserves led to the
disintegration of the agricultural economies of these people. This gave
impetus to a bloody liberation struggle with the main driving force: land.
Due to the violent nature of the liberation struggle, a constitutional settlement
was negotiated, which protected white settler land and committed the new
government to pay compensation for white lands required. The Lancaster
House Constitution, which was accepted in 1979, protected the white settler
land through the willing seller-willing buyer clause. In following years the
Mugabe government blamed the externally imposed Lancaster House
Constitution for the poor delivery rate, as this agreement impeded radical land
reform programmes. Observers to the liberation struggle viewed the "land
provision of the Lancaster House Constitution as an essential part of the
political solution to the war" (Herbst, 1991: 271). In 1980 Zimbabwe attained
independence.
During the initial years following independence, the Zimbabwean government
resettled" 8 600 families on 520 000 hectares of land" (Herbst, 1991: 271).
By 1984 some "18 % of the white-owned land had been redistributed to
Africans" (Sobhan, 1993: 73). This figure included those white-owned land
were some white settlers fled out of Zimbabwe but most of the white settler
community stayed. Initially, the land reform programme of Zimbabwe looked
very promising, transferring only 10 % less land than Kenya but the
restrictions of the Lancaster House Agreement had tremendous strains on the
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optimal provision of adequate land. As stated earlier, only a few white settlers
decided to leave Zimbabwe and only a few white farmers were willing to sell
their land or a portion of their land. The Mugabe government could not
properly provide the infrastructure needed to assist new farmers, as they were
forced to acquire land that "needed a great deal of preparation before it could
be farmed" (Herbst, 1991: 272).
Ten years after independence "51 000 families had been resettled on 2,65
million ha of land" (Cloete, 1992: 254). In 1990 the "Zimbabwean government
attempted to adopt new legislation, which would empower the government to
acquire any land they consider necessary to confiscate [and] to determine fair
compensation within a reasonable time frame" (Cloete, 1992: 254),
furthermore, to restrict ownership of land to one farm and to pay
compensation in local currency. This attempted change in legislation had a
dramatic impact on the politics of resettlement in Zimbabwe, as the state was
not in a position to create prosperity.
In 1997 the government published a list of "1,471 farms that were to be
expropriated and resettled without compensation" (Peters & Malan, 2000:
156). The fund donors did not favour this controversial move of the Mugabe
government. Furthermore, Mugabe's reluctance to withdraw from the civil war
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was not in alignment with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and financial aid was
suspended. The Zimbabwean government was criticised both locally and
abroad for crediting an election campaign that favoured violence. The illegal
occupation of white-owned land "since February 2000" (Mapenzauswa, 2001:
2) has damaged investor confidence, which indicate very poor economy
recovery. This new phase of land reform in Zimbabwe is a source of great
concern, as the continued dominance by the Mugabe government is a
constraint to the proper evolution of an appropriate land reform policy.
It was believed that land reform programmes in Africa were extremely slow
paced and insufficiently administrated to fulfill the needs of the indigenous
groups. Looking at Kenya; there are strong arguments supporting the notion
7
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1.1.3 South Africa
that land reform programmes had some level of success, partly due to "better
agro-ecological conditions" (Herbst, 1991: 271) but the intensification of land
reform will have definite benefits for the rising political and economic strains
created by poverty. The Zimbabwean government faces a volatile situation,
as expectations were high that the government would deliver on expected
benefits such as land.
Goforth (1998: 1) stated that "South Africa's apartheid regime was one of the
ugliest experiments in human history". It contributed to the current situation
where more than "3,5 -7 million people" (Stanich, 2000: 22) are dispossessed
and land hungry. The Land Act of 1913 shaped the land distribution to "87 %
of the most arable land given to a ruling minority, and the remaining 13 % to
the majority, who were disenfranchised at the time" (Matlou, 2000: 1). Matlou
(2000: 1) reported that the South African Land Reform policy was designed to
reverse land ownership created by the Land Act of 1913.
In 1994 the newly elected ANC government faced the "staggering racial
imbalance in land ownership" (Stanich, 2000: 22). These racial imbalances
were shaped by the political, social and economic history of South Africa. The
government provided a land reform policy with four basic objectives: firstly, to
redress the injustices of apartheid; secondly, to foster national reconciliation
and stability with South Africa; thirdly, to underpin economic growth; and
lastly, to improve household welfare and alleviate poverty.
The Land Reform Programme in South Africa consists of three legs that were
put in place to improve overall welfare and to alleviate poverty in the country.
Land restitution usually involves "returning land lost, or compensating victims
who lost property since 19 June 1913" (Matlou, 2000: 1) as a result of racially
discriminatory laws or practices, and without just and equitable compensation,
at the time of dispossession. Land redistribution enables the "poor and
disadvantaged people in South Africa to buy land with the help of
8
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Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant/Land Redistribution for Agricultural
Development Sub-Programmes (LRAD)" (DUA, 2001: 76). The land tenure
reform aims to privatise state-owned land in order to bring all people
occupying land under one legal system of landholding. It aims to provide help
to "resolve tenure disputes and provide alternatives for people who are
displaced in the process" (DUA, 2001: 76).
This research assignment focuses on the Restitution of land rights as a
process. In South Africa victims of land dispossession had until December
1998 to lodge official claims for the restoration of their land rights. Matlou
(2000: 1) stated that the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994 provides
victims with five ways of restoration: firstly, the government provides the
restoration of land from which claimants were disposed; secondly, they will
make provision for alternative land; thirdly, government will provide monetary
compensation to claimants; fourthly, government will provide preferential
access to government housing; and lastly, government will assist claimants
with land development programmes.
A critique against the Land Reform policy in general and more specific the
Restitution of land rights programme, is that the progress has been slow since
its inception. Although President Thabo Mbeki, in his state of the Nation
Address 2002, "acknowleged the lifted number of settled claims from 12, 094
[in 2000-2001] to just over 29, 000" (Commission on Restitution of Land
Rights) in 2002, there is a call from grass-roots level to speed up land
restitution. There is a growing frustration from communities who remained
unclear to understand the complex administrative nature of the restitution
process of land rights.
9
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1.2 PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY
This contribution to the study of land reform argues that land reforms originate
in a change in the balance of power in society and that the nature of this
adjustment in relations of power has a profound effect on the outcome of the
reforms. Thus, the proposed study would be an in-depth investigation into
land reform and restitution processes in Kenya and Zimbabwe. It is
paramount to fully conceptualise land restitution in the context of Africa. This
study will also focus on the frustrations surrounding this concept, thus
determining why implementation was more successful in Kenya and more
problematic in Zimbabwe, especially in light of the fact that they received so
much international attention and funding. Furthermore, to capture the varying
circumstances and experiences of land restitution in Kenya and Zimbabwe,
the outcome of this study is to stimulate further debate on land restitution in
Africa by comparing these two countries' similarities, differences and
outcomes of land restitution. The study will also determine a further need for
land reform focusing on preconditions for revitalising land reform and finally, it
can provide a conceptually sound framework how South Africa could improve
on its land restitution policies.
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This thesis is an empirical comparative study analysing existing data.
Comparative studies focus on the similarities and (especially) differences
between groups or units of analysis. Such objects can include individual
organisations, cultures, countries, societies, institutions and even individuals.
The units of analysis identified to be used for this study are Kenya and
Zimbabwe and their restitution policies. The selection of cases or units of
analysis was done for comparative purposes.
Mayer (in Landman, 2000: 12) claims "comparative analysis is a method that
plays a central role in the explanatory mission of political science itself.
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Landman (2000: 4) identifies "four main objectives, all of which co-exist and
are mutually reinforcing in any systematic comparative study". The first
identifiable objective is the "process of describing the political phenomena and
events of a particular country, or group of countries" (Landman, 2000: 5).
Contextual description is thus viewed as the starting point for all systematic
research. The second identifiable objective, classification, is regarded as a
"necessary component of systematic comparison, but in many ways it
represents a higher level of comparison since it seeks to group many
separate descriptive entities into simpler categories" (Landman, 2000: 5).
Furthermore, it aims to reduce complexities by seeking out those qualities that
countries share and those that they do not share. The third objective is the
search for those objectives that may aid the researcher to explain what has
been described and classified. Lijphart (in Landman, 2000: 6) claims
"comparison allows testing hypothesized empirical relationships among
variables". The fourth objective is regarded by most scholars as the most
difficult of comparative politics as it aims to make "predictions about outcomes
in other countries based on the generalizations from the initial comparison, or
to make claims about future political outcomes" (Landman, 2000: 10).
However, hypothesis-testing and prediction (i.e. objectives three and four) are
not relevant for the purpose of this research assignment
The primary focus would be text data, which is appropriate for the interpretive
nature of this study. The strength of this particular type of analysis is the logic
of comparison. A comparative study approximates causal inferences that
allow scholars to attempt stronger causal hypotheses. It also allows for
comparison of different theoretical viewpoints across different settings. A
limitation of comparative studies is the comparability of cases. In the case of
this study the definition of the concept of land restitution varies within Kenya
and Zimbabwe. It is therefore essential to define key concepts concerning
land reform/restitution before embarking on an in-depth study of this subject.
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1.4 DEFINING CONCEPTS
1.4.1 Land reform
Land reform is a difficult concept to define, as access to land is a primary
human need. It became a popular tool of African governments to correct past
colonial wrongs. In the post-colonial era both reformers and revolutionaries
saw land reform as a mechanism to "modernisation and structural change of
their backward societies" (Sobhan, 1993: 1). One element of land reform was
thus to eradicate rural poverty. Therefore, it is not surprising that "[t]hird world
governments, or even radical opposition political parties, placed land reform
high on their policy agendas" (Sobhan, 1993: 3), with the pervasive
persistence of the rural landless' desire to eliminate poverty and agricultural
stagnation as driving forces of land reform in developing countries.
Universally, land reform was seen as the redistribution of property or rights in
property for the benefit of the landless, tenants and farm labourers. Adams
(1995: 1) viewed Africa as an example of land reform where the primary
concern was correcting the imbalance of agricultural land as Africa has a
history of subsistence farming. Jacoby (1971: 24) viewed land reform or
agrarian reform as frequently used terms to denote any integrated programme
that aim to reorganise the institutional framework of agriculture in order to
facilitate social and economic progress in accordance with the philosophy,
values and creed of the community concerned. The United Nations defined
land reform as "comprising an integrated programme of measures designed to
eliminate the obstacles to economic and social development arising out of
defects in the agrarian structure" (Jacoby, 1971: 24), as millions of black
African farmers were forced to crowd onto plots too small and with "soil
qualities too marginal for even subsistence farming" (Baines, 2001: 1).
Challenges for the various governments would be to find a way to bridge the
racial ownership gap in land, homes and buildings or be held responsible for
12
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future social instability, furthermore, to turn a broad constitutional commitment
into a workable programme of government. Access to land is therefore, a
determinant of the distribution of income and wealth in a society. The Urban
Foundation recommended that land reform is the "foundation on which a new
political dispensation and development strategy will be built" (The Urban
Foundation, 1991: 1). Edigheji (2000: 34) points out that in racially divided
countries where minority racial groups had dominated the political and
economic system, after independence the outcome would be political
instability
Approaches to land reform has taken different forms and met with varying
success in terms of coverage and impact. It must be kept in mind that the
demands and circumstances for land reform varies across nations and
thereby conditions the character, dimension and outcome of reforms. In the
light thereof, land reform in Africa was characterised thus far by "external
controls or prohibitions by law on property rights for instance: nationalisation
and collectivisation; restitution; redistribution policies involving expropriation of
land, with or without compensation" (Adams, 1995: 2). Moyo (1995: 73)
defined land reform as a change in the legal or customary institution of
property rights and duties, which define the rights of those who own or use
agricultural land. There is a direct link between land reform and ownership,
as the latter refer to rights representing varying degrees of control: "the right
to possess, use, manage, earn an income from, lend, transfer or sell, as well
as to pass these rights on to others" (Moyo, 1995: 73).
Land reform consists of three major issues: firstly tenure reforms, which
consist of tenure changes in, state land, communal land, tenureship and
private property; secondly, redistribution programmes, which entails
developmental projects, co-operatives, subsidies or capital, training, extension
of existing property and marketing; and thirdly, restitution provides the redress
of imposed dispossession as mentioned before. The key issues here are
equity and production.
13
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1.4.2 Land restitution
Land restitution is a component of the broader land reform programme, which
aims to restore the right to land to those who lost it as a result of racially, and
discriminatory legislation and practices. Simplistically, land restitution in the
African context is concerned about "giving back land to those communities
and individuals who were forcibly removed" (Matlou, 2000: 1).
1.4.3 Willing-seller /Willing-buyer
The Land Acquisition Act drawn up in the spirit of the 1979 Lancaster House
Agreement in Zimbabwe made provisions for a "willing-seller, willing buyer"
(Stiff, 2000: 20) clause in Section 57. This Act gave the government the right
to purchase excess land for the purpose of redistribution to the landless. It
also protected commercial white-landowners against forced land confiscation
from the government. The Lancaster House agreement provided a clause
that stated that the 'willing-seller, willing buyer' clause could not be changed
for ten years. In 1992, The Land Acquisition Act was enacted to speed up the
land reform process by removing the 'willing seller, willing buyer' clause. The
Act empowered the government to buy land compulsorily for redistribution,
and a fair compensation was to be paid for land acquired. Furthermore,
landowners were given the right to go to court if they did not agree to the price
set by the acquiring authority.
1.4.4 Confiscationl Expropriation
Confiscation is to take property away by the use of authority. Prosterman et
al (1987: 194) perceives a reform to be confiscatory in nature, when it
deprives landowners of a major portion of their capital, their income and their
economic security. Literature suggests that governments supporting land
confiscation are likely to use "fraudulent means of control, bribery, perjury,
administrative sabotage and even force if necessary" (Prosterman et ai, 1987:
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194). The absence of adequate compensation results in a decline of the
economic and agricultural strength of landowners and the nation as a whole.
1.4.5 Compensation
Hunt (1984: 282) noted that any redistributive land reform inevitably raised the
question of whether those who lose land rights should be compensated and, if
so, by what means. Compensation could be defined as the commitment of
government to owner-property rights and the just payment for land acquired.
Compensation is significantly not only for the landowners but also for the
creditors who have made loans against the security of the land. Therefore, it
should be noted that the effects of land reform and compensation reaches all
spheres of society. Compensation is thus vital if nonrevolutionary land reform
is to be politically feasible. The degree of compensation to be made to the
affected landowners appears to be a "key independent variable that is likely to
determine whether really effective land reform can be carried out in that
particular society at a particular time" (Prosterman et ai, 198?: 194). The
inability to resolve this issue in a more acceptable manner to landowners
represents a crucial block to the implementation of land reform.
1.4.6 Restoration
Land restitution primarily deals with giving back land to those individuals or
communities who were forcibly removed form their land under a dominant
power. Matlou (2000: 1) stated that restitution of land claims could be divided
into the provision of alternative land to the disposed or the access to monetary
compensation but more importantly the restoration or reinstatement of the
actual land or property right to claimants who were disposed.
15
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1.4.7 Revolutionary vs. evolutionary land reforms
Adams (1995: 1) defined revolutionary change as advocating a drastic,
planned public intervention to the redistribution of land. Evolutionary policies
involve the expropriation and compensation of land. These two concepts
indicate the illiberal and liberal level of state intervention to the land reform
question.
1.4.8 Settler community
Ogot et al (1995: 11) stated that colonialism operated on a principle that
barbarism pervaded Africa, therefore, there was no culture to salvage. It was
thus, expected from the European settlers to proceed with the civilising
mission and introduce Africans to modernity and contact with human
civilisation. It could thus be stated that the settler community was at the horn
of colonialism, as they did not belong to the indigenous community and did
not share in their culture, beliefs and traditions.
1.4.9 Nepotism and corruption
After independence, the most African countries inherited social, economic and
political problems. The national political elites assumed the administrative
responsibilities and duties previously discharged by the colonial authorities.
However, Meredith (2002: 16-17) reports that the absolute transferal of power
without procedural accountability often led to corruption and cases of
nepotism, where high ranking officials favoured relatives and friends by
providing them with governmental positions as well as land.
16
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1.5 SUMMARY
1.4.10 Negotiability of goods
Albin (1991: 49) stated that the nature of the goods determined if it was
divisible or indivisible. It should be noted that economic conflict is easily
negotiable but land, which is an emotional commodity, would loose its
meaning, quality and commercial value by dividing it.
The social and economic progress achieved through land reform would
greatly contribute to social equity as well as increased production provided
settlement projects, financing and marketing schemes are in place in the post-
colonised countries.
The present study, therefore, explores issues of social and economic
relevance, but in particular country contexts. Different countries still have
much to learn form each other's experiences. Therefore, the issues that are
explored in this study had an impact on the development of land reform not
only in Kenya or Zimbabwe but also throughout the world. The aim of the
study was to stimulate further discussion on the need for land reform in other
developing countries; possible lessons for South Africa will be highlighted.
The primary argument of this study is directly derived from the Economic and
Public Policy Agenda for Kenya, which believes that the need for a land policy
is pivotal as land "... in most cases... is the most important, if not the only
means of livelihood; it is the foundation of shelter, food, work and indeed, a
sense of nationhood. It is also one of the most important ways through which
political influence is likely to be practiced ... " (An Economic and Public Policy
Agenda for Kenya, 1998: 1).
17
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CHAPTER TWO: KENYA
2.1 COLONIAL PATTERN
The late 1890's marked the start of Britain's land expansion policies. This
period saw the formation of the British East African Company, which was
based in Mombassa, thus linking the history of colonialism directly to the
Uganda railway. The initial agreement was that "11 000 pounds should be
paid annually to the Sultan of Zanzibar" (Arnold, 1974: 172) for the lease of
the East African Protectorate. Majdalaney (1962: 8) reported that soon after
the completion of the Uganda railway and spending more than five million
pounds the British government had no use for it. This prompted the decision
to colonise the uninhabited East African Protectorate. Throughout the colonial
history white settlement was officially encouraged to settle on land with a
superb climate and cheap labour, which was conducive for agricultural
practices. Within five years the railways shown a considerable profit and
"within ten years it was beginning to look as though the country would be
doing the same" (Majdalaney, 1962: 10).
The East African Protectorate faced an "accumulation of disasters during the
1890's, such as rinderpest, small-pox, drought and locust, which produced
famine and decimated the Kikuyu (referred in some sources as Gikuyu) tribe"
(Arnold, 1974: 172). The British believed that due to the fact that large areas
was uninhabited in Kenya that they did not displace any of the indigenous
communities. During this time the Kikuyu, who was approximately 300,000
strong was the largest population group in Kenya. They roamed the forest
edges as they constantly feuded with the Maasai. In 1896 the Kikuyu made
agreements with the British that they could cultivate the land on a temporary
basis but the British regarded this agreement as the obtainment of permanent
transferal rights of the land. Thus, the colonial powers that inhabited Kenya
felt strongly about the fact that they did not steal any land from the local
communities, as the later did not make use of it. Majdalaney (1962: 11)
18
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argued that land ownership in Kenya was a European concept as Africans did
not own land but tribes merely clustered themselves on a piece of land for
usage (subsistence farming) and traditional purposes but in Kikuyu culture
land and the ownership of land stood center to their entire existence. In
Kenya the Kikuyu society combined the ownership of land with their regulation
of marriage. Like in many African cultures land inevitably became a symbol of
power, integrity and security both to the Africans and settlers.
Colonial practices in Kenya were designed to create a divide between the
rulers and the ruled although the colonial powers intrinsically believed that it
was to benefit the Africans. It was maintained that colonialism had brought
with it the benefits of "education, religion, modern commerce and government
and it rendered the invaluable service of drawing Africans into the mainstream
of human civilisation" (Maloba, 1998: 1). However, Anderson (2000: 459)
argued that the recruitment of African labour at poor rates of pay and under
primitive conditions of work was characteristic of the operation of colonial
capitalism in Africa during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. During this
time the colonial authorities were the largest employers of labour and criticism
of labour laws were likely to be interpreted as a critique against the state. The
government imposed the Master and Servant Statute (M & S statute) of 1906
upon the African community, as an attempt to control and regulate labour and
the movement of Africans in Kenya.
The colonial pattern in Kenya was the greatest determinant of the current
situation in Kenya. The end of the First World War marked a heightening of
racial politics, which resulted in the emergence of the first racial political
activity among Africans in Kenya. Colonialism in Kenya was once described
as land invasions on a devastating scale, which inevitably resulted in mass
hysteria. The British authorities added to this problem by recruiting white
South African farmers to the East Protectorate, who added their own
"particular brand of conduct and race attitudes" (Arnold, 1974: 56) to the
colonial scene. The African community revolted against colonialism as a
"refusal to simply accept the role given to them by Europeans" (Arnold, 1974:
16).
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The colonial powers imposed the "Kipande system" on the local community.
This was an identity certificate for all African males of sixteen or over, which
obliged them to carry registration cards on which their fingerprints had been
impressed, so that they could be more easily identified and thus controlled.
This Kipande system and the newly imposed hut taxes were but only two of
the main issues, which were taken up by a new generation of young African
politicians and freedom fighters. Related economic and political events such
as "slump conditions in agriculture, reduction in wages, taxation, debarring
form growing coffee and no presentation in government" (Arnold, 1974: 18)
only intensified the hold of the colonial powers of the local community.
During the 1920's the name of the British East Africa Protectorate officially
changed to Kenya Colony and it marked the beginning of African nationalism.
The start of the East African Association, which later changed to the Kikuyu
Central Association (KCA) marked the battle cry of Kenyans onwards: "Give
us back our Land" (Arnold, 1974: 27). The Kikuyu had always been regarded
as politically motivated people and colonial suppression did in fact breed
extremism. In 1944 the Kenya African Union (KAU), which replaced the KCA,
was officially banned and this fostered a social, economic and political interest
in all Africans across Kenya.
The 1950's marked the start of a process, which ultimately produced the
longest and most horrific period in Kenya's history. Jomo Kenyatta, the Light
of Kenya, is still regarded as the man who brought the light of independence
to Kenya. His arrest forced the pace of nationalism in Kenya, and thereafter
Mau-Mau took their killing oath. It became clear that Jomo Kenyatta provided
the leadership that could unify the nationalist movement in Kenya. During this
period there was no or little dialogue between the Africans and the colonial
settlers and government. Arnold (1974: 45) stated that this gave rise to
frustration and produced the explosion of Mau-Mau. Warwick
(http://www.multiline.com.au/-markw/maumau.html) believed that behind the
uprising was the force of what Harold MacMillan called the "winds of change"
blowing through Africa and fanning fires of nationalism.
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2.2 THE MAU-MAU UPRISING
The Mau-Mau in Kenya was regarded as the most controversial happening to
date in the country as its psychology and origins could not be properly defined
as of yet. The Mau-Mau emerged as an instrument of nationalism as
conditions were favourable for liberation struggle; alienated tribal land and
landless squatters resisting the colonial system. Therefore, scholars
considered Mau-Mau as the "outcome of both state violence and African
reaction and counterviolence" (Maloba, 1998: 2). To the settlers and the
conservatives they were regarded as barbarians whose aim was destruction.
To those who supported them they were regarded as the only means to attain
freedom, land and self-determination in Kenya. Many argued that Mau-Mau
was incidental of the freedom process, while others view it as central to the
cause.
The Mau-Mau guerrillas demanded the return of settled land and initially did
not emphasise independence from colonial powers. Oaths, which were seen
as a form of witchcraft or sorcery, were central to the Mau-Mau and the
colonial powers focused on it, as it was not received well even with the liberal
Christian community. The Mau-Mau did not have comparable propaganda
machinery, which the colonial powers possessed as this did the most harm to
their cause as they could not defend their aims and objectives. The
authorities declared a state of emergency.
After the imprisonment of Jomo Kenyatta and other freedom fighters there
was a degree of hope, as it was believed that this would eventually give a
voice to the disenfranchised. However, it soon became evident that the
colonial powers only imposed further restriction on the indigenous community.
Their sentencing on 8 April 1953 transformed the mood of the people form
"guarded optimism to desperation" (Maloba, 1998: 114). In the Central
Provinces, the White Highlands (currently the Highlands zone) and Nairobi the
conditions of desperation and fear, gave birth to Mau-Mau, as described
above.
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Maloba (1998: 23) argued that before the emergency there was not a general
revolt between the Kikuyu and the colonial powers and it is safe to say that
the state of emergency gave rise to the Kikuyu revolt. The declaration of a
state of emergency seemed merely to have stimulated and increased the
violence. The Kikuyu were forced to the forest and it was mainly they who
fought against the colonial powers during the height of unrest from 1952 to
1956. Donald Barnett stated that a "reaction to external stimuli rather than the
unfolding of a well laid plan for revolutionary action or guerrilla warfare"
(Maloba, 1998: 114) directed the entry of youths and other militants to the
mountains. The freedom fighters generally came from the reserves in Central
Province. They were people who were landless or small landholders who
were restricted to produce and sell due to colonial restrictions. It must be
noted however, that not all freedom fighters entered the forests willingly but
that some youths were captured by force. To be sure, more black people
than white people were killed by the Mau-Mau.
Those who entered the forests willingly have taken the warrior oath prior the
state of emergency. The main reason for reverting to the forest was its
favourable environment for guerrilla warfare, protection and a rich supply of
food, which they soon found out not to be the case. The forest of Mount
Kenya and Aberdares provided natural protection to guerrillas but also to
those who fled colonial oppression in the reserves. One of the reasons for the
eventual failure of Mau-Mau was that it did not have an operator through
which it could communicate and link its military and political activities with
each other in the forests. This seriously impeded their formulated long and
short-term ideals and goals. The freedom fighters relied heavily on relatives
and friends in the reserves for information and food, for which they often used
force to obtain.
A loose union of small groups characterised the structure of Mau-Mau during
the first seven months of the revolt. The guerrilla forces that operated
between 1952 and 1954 had great success due to the fact that government
forces were not effective in stopping them. The Lari-Massacre of 1953 was
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regarded as the high point of Mau Mau violence but the destruction and
brutality were not receivedwell by the liberal international world.
They revised their tactics and after March 1953 the struggle was
characterised by "tightly organised groupings concentrated within a number of
large, permanent camp clusters" (Maloba, 1998: 116). There was a unified
need of survival and to counteract the colonial operations they created the
Kenya Defense Council. Maloba (1998: 117) reports that the Mwathe meeting
in August 1953 brought together the military leaders and the independent
units to establish organised and structural patterns for future attack against
the colonial powers. During this meeting it was agreed upon that the Kenya
Defense Council would rather legitimise than alter the positions previously
held by guerrilla leaders. The outcome of this meeting was that eight Land
and Freedom Armies were officially recognised and that they would attempt to
formulate military strategy. It should be kept in mind that many guerrilla units,
which did not attend the Mwathe meeting, still operated independently. It
became apparent that the Kenya Defense Council had no or limited significant
input in the entire struggle. Many observers agreed that the unity that was
created was symbolic and not effective by no means. The Kenya Defense
Council had problems convening meetings as they had a large membership
and that the units were scattered in the forest.
In February 1954 the "Kenya Parliament" (Maloba, 1998: 118) was formed
which replaced the Kenya Defense Council. The Kenya Parliament
envisioned itself as to evolve into a "legitimate interim African government of
Kenya" (Maloba, 1998: 118). However, it soon became evident that the
Kenya Parliament just like its predecessor could not succeed in organising the
activities among the various units. Maloba (1998: 132) argued that the
primary reason for Mau-Mau failure was its inability to link its military and
political strategy. Idealistically they thought that everyone knew why they had
taken up arms but this was not the case. The success of guerrilla warfare
relies ultimately on organisation before combat, and the Mau-Mau failed to
have a politicisation campaign before and during the revolt. Furthermore, it is
widely believed that "[g]uerrilla warfare is essentially a political war, and
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military efforts are important only as they advance the political agenda"
(Maloba, 1998: 121).
Another element that negatively influenced the Mau-Mau was the criminal and
parasitic elements, which were called the komerera, took advantage of the
liberation cause and robbed local inhabitants of property while masquerading
as Mau-Mau. This contributed to the fact that from 1954 Mau-Mau lost the
battle as their reputation lost appeal with sympathisers: it also remained
mainly a Kikuyu-based organisation and not nation-wide. The colonial powers
also succeeded to drive the guerrillas deeper into the forests, which
disconnected them from their supply lifelines. The colonial troops gained
success due to the fact that the guerrillas relied heavily on seers, witchdoctors
and spiritual mediums for strategic planning and calculations. Unfortunately,
they failed to see the importance of railways and electricity and the Mau-Mau
was characterised by an absence of real episodes of sabotage. Warwick
(http://www.multiline.com.au/-markw/maumau.html) argued that the hardship
of the forest and the shortage of ammunition shattered the fighting spirit of
Mau Mau.
In 1955 the government declared amnesty for those who surrendered and
many of those who were forced did surrender to the colonial powers. The
government implemented a programme of "decontamination" (Maloba, 1998:
137), which was aimed at ridding the indigenous community of Mau-Mau
sympathy. The colonial powers promised the African community a much
more attractive future than that which the Mau-Mau could ever have provided.
This decontamination programme was already incorporated in 1953 during
the revolt, and also contributed to the weakening of Mau-Mau as they lost
support. The colonial powers created detention camps for this purpose but
these were not favourably received by the African community due to the Hola
incident, where men died as a result of extreme brutality.
The government counteracted with the Swynnerton plan, which represented
government's determination to increase agricultural production in the African
reserves. This plan entailed the "modification of customary land rights in
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favo[u]r of individual freeholds based on plot demarcation and private
registration" (Miller et ai, 1994: 26). This plan envisioned that Africans should
have access to profitable cash-crop agriculture and to increase the carrying
capacity and productivity of land in the reserves while also raising. The
government intended to provide African farmers with "farm credit, agricultural
extension services, and technical assistance, but most importantly the
provision of water supplies" (Miller et ai, 1994: 26). Furthermore, the
Swynnerton Plan assisted the government with the concentration of rural
Kikuyu into village/reserves to proceed with their decontamination
programme. Thus, the colonial powers viewed the rehabilitation programme
as a political and administrative success. However, Maloba (1998: 144)
reports that economically this Swynnerton Plan was a failure, as it could not
produce large landholders who would employ labourers. The government
could not succeed in reforming the country's economic and political
environment and by the end of the emergency in 1960 emotions of fear and
confusion were high amongst the Mau-Mau loyalists.
The greatest fear of the colonial powers in Africa was a rise in African
nationalism and moreover that they would steer towards communism. During
this time the African nationalist movement was still splintered but two mutual
objectives bound them. They agreed on the release of Jomo Kenyatta and
the land issue, although there was some disagreement on how land should be
acquired. Kanu's official policy was that white settlers should voluntarily
surrender parts of their land and that it will be compensated fully. Many
Africans acknowledged the positive role of the white settlers and suggested
that they should continue with their agricultural activities, as they were the
largest contributors to Kenya's agriculture and economy.
The Kenyatta government benefited from this scheme as it had access to
government loans and credit and acquired the best available land. The Mau-
Mau fighters were seldom appointed to high governmental posts or land as
was originally thought, due to the fact that Kenyatta later on distanced himself
from Mau-Mau ideology and practices. However, the Kanu manifesto gave an
indirect acknowledgment of the Mau-Mau during liberation struggle. Kenyatta
25
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
26
believed that forgetting Mau-Mau was a vital aspect of this whole healing
operation of the nation.
2.3 THE BRITISH SETTLEMENT FUND/PRIVATE LAND
PURCHASE
After the 1962 Lancaster House Conference, the colonial powers proposed
land legislation that would aid the European settlers during the dying days of
colonialism in Kenya. The first official land policy was created in 1961 when
the government implemented the Land Development and Settlement Board
(LDSB). The LDSB was authorised to purchase land from white settlers at
"1959 prices, which was higher than the 1961 prices" (Maloba, 1998: 163) due
to the substantial depreciation on land value. Unfortunately, this land reform
policy only favoured two types of Africans. Maloba (1998: 163) stated that
this system only favoured the yeoman and peasant who had some level of
capital but the landless-peasants, detainees, and ex-guerrilla fighters were
excluded from this list and had no access to land. This restriction that was
placed upon land fuelled hostility and hatred against the colonial powers.
The colonial government revised its land policy and aided by the British
government provided funds "as a loan for the purchase of 20,000 acres
annually over a period of five years" (Maloba, 1998: 164). The transferal of
land to African families provided the colonial government with another
mechanism of rehabilitation of Mau-Mau loyalists. Rewarding those who
showed considerable loyalty towards the colonial government and European
settlers, while no land was transferred to those who were suspected of
subversive activities.
With independence, when Kanu (led by Kenyatta) won the election in 1963 it
inherited the million-acre scheme and landed themselves in debt that had to
be paid back. Kenyatta proposed a self-help programme, Harambee, which
meant pulling together. Dgot et al (1995: 137) argue that this concept of self-
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help was foreign to the traditional Africans in Kenya as it was common
practice that everything should aid the group but the people received
Harambee positively.
The resettlement of Africans on European farms was the main objective of the
Kenyatta government after independence. Prior to independence the
Kenyatta government agreed on a "principle of private ownership in land and
free enterprise" (Maloba, 1998: 163). Initially funds were gathered from the
World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD))
and the Colonial Development Corporation to purchase farms and to provide
to some degree a monetary income. Ogot et al (1995: 88) reported that large
farms were transferred to citizens as intact units, with credit assistance from
the Land Bank. Unfortunately, when Kenyatta consolidated his power he
favoured an "informal system of nepotism and favouritism" (Miller et ai, 1994:
37). Nevertheless, Jomo Kenyatta left Daniel Arap Moi with an
entrepreneurial legacy and fast paced economic reform during the first years
after independence.
2.4 THE ROLES THE AGRICULTURAL FINANCE CORPORATION
AND INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORA TION SINCE INDEPENCE
Ogot et al (1995: 83) stated that Kenya's colonial economy displayed the
characteristics of an underdeveloped country. Kenya was still dominated by
"foreign capital, the dominance of the agriculture, the limited development of
industry and heavy reliance on export of primary products and imports of
capital and manufactured consumer goods" (Ogot et ai, 1995: 83). The
political and economic environment of Kenya after independence called for
revised policies, which could address urban and rural poverty and decay. The
three most urgent issues in Kenya were unemployment, the redistribution of
land and education. The government provided a paper "African Socialism,
which rejected western capitalism and eastern communism" (Arnold, 1974:
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158) but most sectors of the economy were dominated by "market forces and
Kenya's foreign policy was closely aligned with that of the West" (Baynham,
1989: 225). Tom Mboya the Minister of Economic Planning and Development
believed that African Socialism would "guarantee every citizen, whether rich
or poor, full and equal political rights" (Ogot et ai, 1995: 84). From the start of
independence the economy was characteristic of a mixed economy rather
than a socialist one as the Kenyatta government regarded communism just as
bad as colonialism.
Before independence Africanisation was the promise to the disenfranchised
communities in Kenya. The Europeans "dominated the agriculture, industry,
while the Asians controlled the trade and commerce". After independence it
was the objective of the Kenyatta government to break the non-Kenyan hold
on the economy of the country, which guided the government to impose
various restrictive measure. Ogot et al (1995: 114) reported that this
produced the mass migration of Asians to Britain in February 1968, as levels
of unemployment and the need for Africanisation intensified feelings of
resentment towards Asians.
The government ensured the transferal of "capital and economy into the
hands of Africans" (Ogot et ai, 1995: 86) through the extension of credit by
creating state credit institutions, such as the Agricultural Finance Corporation
(AFC) and the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC).
The AFC was created in 1963 and re-established in 1969, with the primary
aim to provide credit for buying or rehabilitating large farms. The AFC
furthermore, administers the Guaranteed Minimum Return programme for
wheat and maize in Kenya. It was report that in 1972 the AFC's credit to
"2,500 large-scale farmers and ranches had amounted to 12 million pounds,
plus 2.5 million pounds to 14,500 small-scale farmers" (Ogot et ai, 1995: 86).
The ICDC was founded in 1964 with the task to administer the Commercial
Loans Revolving Fund, which was established to aid Kenyan citizen traders,
especially those who "acquired business by non-Kenyans through the
government's Kenyanisation [Africanisation] programme" (Ogot el, 1995: 86).
28
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
29
It should be noted that trade owned by Africans increased considerably form
48 % in 1966 to 80 % in 1971. Although, it should be mentioned that 83% of
the land is arid and semi-arid, while the rest is coastal and upland areas of
medium to high potential land, suitable for agricultural purposes and
furthermore, Okoth-Ogenda (1996: 113) reports that over 80 % of the entire
population lives in the medium to high potential areas. Kenya enjoyed the title
of being the model of economic opportunity and political stability in East
Africa. Miller et al (1994: 3) report that 350 multinational corporations were
then based in Nairobi and that twenty thousand foreign residents belong to
the community.
After independence Kenya's economy was primarily based on land
exploitation for agriculture, tourism, human settlements, industrialisation, and
pastoralism. There developed three main types of land tenure after
independence: private, customary and public. Many authors claim that the
mixture of British land law and Kenyan traditional tenure or customary law
contributed to the inadequate land reform programme. Private tenure, in
Kenya is a consequence of the colonial regime, where individual or private
ownership of land is based on both freehold and leasehold systems.
Customary tenure is an example of land that is owned communally and it
includes areas that have not been formally transformed through adjudication,
consolidation and registration by the government. Public tenure in turn
refers to land use of unalienated government land, where land is reserved for
public purposes, unless or until it has been privatised to an individual or
corporate entity through a presidential grant of freehold or leasehold.
Still a large proportion of the entire population lives in absolute poverty. Hunt
(1984: 5) and Okoth-Ogenda (1996: 113) report that almost 85% of the entire
rural population is concentrated on the 20% cultivated area in Kenya.
Although the need for land is forever increasing due to the escalating
population growth, solutions to redistribute land have been exhausted. The
inadequacy of the current land reform should be reconsidered, as it is
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believed that a surplus in the agriculture sector could positively influence and
contribute non-farming production and employment.
2.5 SUMMARY
Kenya has been unable for more than 50 years to establish a sustainable land
reform programme. Many Kenyans saw independence as the end of the
struggle but in fact this was only the starting point of a long battle towards true
economic and political freedom. Ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley in 1993-4
severely undermined land rights as ethnic group and individuals refused to
recognise the existence of property rights. Kenyan Human Rights
Commission reported that over 1,500 people died and 250,000 were
displaced. Wanjala (1996: 129) believed that there is no realistic hope for
land reform in Kenya as political leadership is the direct beneficiary of the
post-Swynnerton private ownership reforms. He furthermore stated that the
uncontrolled privatisation of public land in Kenya only resulted in economic
and agricultural decay. Leach (1996: 128) added to the argument by stating
that there has not been much land reform since independence. He stated that
inadequate land reform policies and legislation contributed to irrelevant
administrative arrangements, which only deepened poverty, as the
constitution will not protect individual land rights.
In recent times agriculture has became pivotal for African countries as their
economies rely heavily on the production of agricultural goods. Okoth-
Ogenda (in Basset et ai, 1993) believed that the Kenyan experience provided
no evidence of increase in agricultural production, but inevitably resulted in
inequalities and the emergence of significant landlessness, which was a result
of the inadequacy of government, to provide credit as was initially proposed.
Hunt (1984: 1) proposed that the redistribution of land should be radically
altered.
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The Moi government has been compared to the colonial government and has
been severely criticised for illegally using land as gifts to buy political support.
In June 1982 the National Assembly amended the constitution, making Kenya
officially a one-party state. Demands for constitutional reform where voiced
from opposition parties and the international donor community. Barkan (1998)
reported that the ethnic clashes and the intensified economic stagnation and
the declining per capita income since the late 1980's forced Kenya to consider
changes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank
threatened the government that donor aid will be suspended if they did not
return to liberalisation and a multiparty politics.
Ndegwa (1998: 193) regarded the 1997 election outcome as a disappointing
confirmation of the extent to which the country's democratic transition has
stalled. Although the crisis in Kenya is just as intense as during the state of
emergency the "people of Kenya have tasted freedom and no longer will be
content without it" (Kiai, 1998: 192). The escalating levels of governmental
corruption concerning land grabbing and violence hold long-term
consequences for the "security for both the security of property rights and the
prospects for democracy in Kenya" (Klopp, 2000: 8). Klopp (2000: 8)
continued by stating that it is difficult and almost impossible to document the
number of land grabs over a period of time, as everything is done in complete
secrecy.
However, the Economic and Public Policy Agenda for Kenya are very
optimistic concerning the land question in Kenya. Many believe that the
constitution of Kenya will be amended in the near future and the land question
will take central position in the process. The Economic and Public Policy
Agenda for Kenya suggests that the new constitution should include:
• Balance land tenure and land use priorities, i.e., the
nexus between land ownership and its use.
• Reassert the land rights of the registered proprietors
acquired through the willing seller-willing buyer principle
or upon first registration.
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• Declare all unalienated government land to be 'public
land', hence only privatisable in the public interest.
• Declare all irregularly acquired government land to be
'public land', hence repossessabie through physical
reversion or full compensation.
• Declare all trust land as belonging to the area residents
according to customary law, thereby reasserting the
superiority of claims by the people vis-a-vis the local
authorities.
• Declare the principle of community participation in natural
resource management through the percolation of tangible
benefits.
• Declare the inalienable right of every Kenyan to shelter
and land-based income-generating work.
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CHAPTER THREE: ZIMBABWE
3.1 THE COLONIAL PA TTERN
The British government strongly believed that they had a moral obligation
towards Africa to spread the "blessings of commerce and Christianity" (De
Waal, 1990: 14). Rivalry between the Germans, Boers and the British to
colonise Southern Africa directed the way to seize Mashonaland (Southern
Rhodesia [1890-1965]; Rhodesia [1965-1979]; Zimbabwe [1980-]). Cecil
John Rhodes succeeded to claim Mashonaland, and subsequently
established the British South Africa Company in 1889. Rhodes negotiated
with King Lobenguia, king of the Matebeles and Mashonas, to give sovereign
powers to the British to establish a government, mining laws and to create a
military force. Stiff (2000: 282) reported that during 1890 the combined tribal
population of Mashonaland and Matebeleland was about 500,000. This
population figure was kept low by "inter-tribal warfare, Arab slave traders and
famine like malaria and sleeping sickness" (Stiff, 2000: 282).
The areas occupied by the Mashona were later demarcated as native
reserves, while the unoccupied and some occupied areas were taken over by
companies like the British East African Company. This was a disturbing time
in Matabele history due to the fact that two-thirds of their cattle were seized by
the colonial powers. The drought and famine like smallpox and rinderpest
contributed to the decline of the tribe. Furthermore, the killing of apparently
healthy cattle by the colonial powers to check for disease was not well
understood by the indigenous community.
To the Mashona and Matabele custom, land was regarded as res communes,
which meant that it belonged to everyone. Stiff (2000: 282) argued that in
Zimbabwe individual or collective ownership of land was unknown and that
the white settlers established a system of land ownership. When the settlers
came to Zimbabwe they created a market for black farmers and it is estimated
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that in "1903 black farmers contributed 90 % of the country's agricultural
output, while white farmers only contributed 10 %" (Stiff, 200: 282)".
However, the colonial powers soon shifted their attention from mining to
develop a white agricultural sector. This eventually directed the movement of
Africans into Native Reserves during the 1920's. The British created the
office of Chief Native Commissioner to handle all the disputes and
administration concerning the Native Reserves. De Waal (1990: 15) reports
that the Rhodesian authorities applied economic pressures by imposing taxes
which could only be paid in money, thus forcing men to leave their homes in
order to earn wages. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930, which was later
replaced by the Land Tenure Act of 1969, made provision that land should be
divided along racial lines. It was decided that "20 million hectares should be
reserved for whites, which included the 13 million [already occupied], while
the native reserves totalled only 8,7 million hectares, later increased to 16,3
million" (Stiff, 2000: 286). It was estimated that more than 90 % of African
men had to forfeit their land rights in order to provide a labour sector for the
settlers.
The administration of the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 was brought to a
stop with the outbreak of the World War II. However, after the war the British
could deploy sufficient administrators to enforce the law. It soon became
evident that subsistence farming in the Native Reserves damaged the land
and the government announced the Land Husbandry Act of 1952, "bringing
with it compulsory de-stocking, which restricted the number of cattle peasant
tribesmen were allowed to possess" (Stiff, 2000:286). The British viewed the
reluctance of the indigenous community to conform to the new rules and
regulations as laziness without consideration of the negative social impact
that it had on men leaving their families and land. This insensitivity was
viewed as a consequence of the indoctrination of the European race viewing
Africans as inferior beings. This ultimately directed the liberation struggle in
Zimbabwe.
In 1957 the political climate in Rhodesia changed and a new moderate
nationalist organisation, the African National Congress (ANC) was launched.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The ANC was a political organisation with the objective to create "non-
racialism and economic progress [and furthermore] suggested the abolition of
discriminatory laws, reform of land allocation, and an extension of the
franchise" (Meredith, 2002: 25). Poverty and political frustration created a
mass movement both in urban and rural areas and the ANC succeeded to
create a big support base. However, Meredith (2002: 25) argued that the
biggest support base was in the rural areas due to the fact that over a period
of thirty years more than half a million Africans had been displaced and their
land given to white settlers. The colonial government viewed the nationalist
movement, as a possible challenge to the government and while there was no
sign of any nationalist revolts or resistance, the ANC was banned in February
1959.
In 1960 the National Democratic Party (NOP)was established but with a more
radical stance on liberation. During this time Robert Mugabe returned to
Rhodesia from Ghana, where he worked as a teacher, taking on an activist
role by joining the nationalist movement in retaliation of the arrest of three
NOPofficials. The march of the 7 000 on 19 July 1960 marked the start of the
nationalist movement moving to full resistance. The name, which the
nationalist movement used to refer to Rhodesia, was Zimbabwe, which was
adopted from the "site of impressive stone ruins near Masvingo that five
centuries before had been the political and religious capital of a black
monarchy" (Meredith, 2002: 27).
The government counteracted with the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act
1960, which was "designed to deal with any future African opposition"
(Meredith, 2002: 27). The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act successfully
restricted freedom of speech, movement, privacy, assembly and association,
and allowed the arrest and detainment of anyone without trial. The NOP held
a meeting in Highfield in December 1961, and it was decided that "[i]f
European-owned industries are used to buy guns which are aimed against
[the indigenous people] then they must withdraw their labour and customs to
destroy those industries" (Meredith, 2002: 29). After this meeting the NOP
was officially banned under the provision of the Law and Order Act. This
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ensured that the 1960's in Rhodesia were characterised by civil disobedience
and armed insurrection. This turbulent decade saw the escalation of civil
unrest and the "political crimes committed were cattle and land related" (Stiff,
2000: 286).
The nationalists launched a new organisation, the Zimbabwe African People's
Union (ZAPU) 1961, within a few days after the NDP was banned. Zapu was
more militaristic in nature compared to its predecessors. The violence
increased and "white targets were now included; forests and crops were
burned; cattle maimed, sabotage attempts made on railway lines, and attacks
carried out on schools and churches" (Meredith, 2002: 29). Consequently,
Zapu was also banned from the political arena and Mugabe and other officials
were arrested and restricted to their home districts for three months. The
Chimurenga (war of liberation) in Zimbabwe was therefore, a modern people's
war that aimed to advance the goals within the style of radical peasant
consciousness.
In December 1962 the white settler community formed a new "right-wing
party, the Rhodesian Front, which became obsessed with the need for
independence from Britain" (Meredith, 2002: 30) and introduced amendments
to the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, including a mandatory death
sentence for sabotage. On 11 November 1965 a Unilateral Declaration of
Independence (UDI) were declared. Shortly afterwards the Zimbabwe African
National Union (Zanu) 1963, was established with the aim to further liberation
struggle. Zapu and Zanu initially both advocated majority rule but eventually
each group tried to assert itself and rivalry between the two groups
developed. Little or no attention was given to the real cause, which was
freedom from an oppressive regime. Meredith (2002: 33) argued that the
rivalry between the two groups where met with discontent with nationalist
sympathisers abroad. The Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith officially
declared that all nationalist parties be banned and their leadership began a
decade in detention. The Battle of Sinoia on 28 April 1966, in which seven
guerrillas died, was the start of the armed struggle and is commemorated as
Chimurenga Day.
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The period between December 1972 and December 1979 was termed by
many observers as the decisive phase of the liberation struggle. Furthermore,
the white farmers' hold on the economy was intensified, as they were
encouraged to increase production. The Rhodesian government aided the
white farmers by "annual subsidies and loans which were running at an
estimated $8 000 per settler-farmer compared to the 60 cents each for black
cultivators" (Stoneman, 1988: 8). The white commercial farmers succeeded
to increase their level of domestic food production from 30 per cent during the
1960's to more than 75 % by 1979.
When Magabe was released after eleven years in prison his objective was to
further the revolutionary struggle under the banner of Zanu but the nationalist
leadership "prevented him from disrupting the formation of a combined
guerrilla army, the Zimbabwe People's Army (Zipa), which was constructed
out of Zanu and Zapu guerrillas" (Meredith, 2002: 37). It should be noted that
Mugabe only succeeded as late as August 1977 to gain the control of the
army and the party. Zanu and Zapu were joint members of the Patriotic Front
but still there was no trust between the two organisations. Although the two
organisations were still formally bonded to the Patriotic Front, Mugabe
decided that Zanu-PF would enter the 1980 election independently due to
Zapu's more moderate stance on liberation. At that time the liberation
struggle in Rhodesia has been ongoing for more than 30 years. Furthermore,
Rhodesia was the last colony and it was inevitable that it should receive
independence. DeWaal (1990: 37) argued that the two months following the
ceasefire on 28 December 1979 was surely one of the most extraordinary
exercises in democracy ever attempted. This directed the way for a historic
victory for Zanu and Mugabe over the other parties. However, Cornwell
(1980: 142) believed that the results of the general elections revealed the
depth of ethnic division in the country that government had to content with to
avoid future ethnic strife.
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3.2 LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT, 1979
The Lancaster House Conference in the United Kingdom in 1979 was seen as
an attempt to negotiate a non-racial society between Ian Smith's Rhodesian
Front and the two liberation parties, Zanu and Zapu. All the parties involved
in the Rhodesian conflict attended the Lancaster House Conference, chaired
by Lord Carrington. It opened on "10 September 1979 and ended after 47
plenary sessions with the signing of formal agreements on 21 December
1979" (Stiff, 2000: 20). Mungazi (1992: 93) believed that during the
conference the administration of the country were officially given to the
Africans.
It was agreed that Rhodesia was in need of a new constitution, allowing for a
new one man, one vote election early in 1980. Furthermore, whites were
guaranteed 20 parliamentary seats for a period of five years. It was also
decided that the British governor, Lord Soames would rule until after the
elections. Stiff (2000: 20) argued that the underlying objective of the
conference was to make sure that Mugabe would not be elected. The
agreement stated: if ZANLA should continue with its brutal intimidation
campaign, the party would be eliminated from the election campaign
altogether. This ensured a cease-fire, while the "guerrillas of both factions
would have to report to various assembly points and be confined until the
elections were over" (Stiff, 2000: 21). During the discussions the three parties
(Rhodesians, ZAPU and ZANU) agreed to form a new army, which was an
amalgamation of the Rhodesian Security Force, ZIPRA and ZANLA. This
new army was called the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA).
The Lancaster House Constitutional proposals divided land into two
categories, "commercial land and tribal trust land" (Stiff, 2000: 288).
Commercial land was defined as land open to purchase with freehold title by
anyone, while "Tribal Trust Land" was held under communal tenure by tribal
authorities empowered to allocate arable plots to tribesmen and allow them
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access to communal grazing land under the guidance of the Tribal Trust Land
Board" (Stiff, 2000: 288).
The British government agreed to assist funding the resettlement programme,
on condition that the programme should be transparent. It was required that
all land acquired by the government should be purchased on a "willing buyer,
willing seller basis and that owners of any land seized by the government be
compensated in foreign currency" (Herbst, 1991: 270). The Lancaster House
Constitution reads: "Every person will be protected from having his property
compulsorily acquired except when the acquisition is in the interest of ... the
development or utilisation of that .... Property in such a manner as to promote
the public benefit or, in the case of under utilised land, settlement of land for
agricultural purposes. When property is wanted for one of these purposes, its
acquisition will be lawful only on condition that the law provides for the prompt
payment of adequate compensation and, where compensation is contested,
that a court order be obtained. A person determine[d] whose property is so
acquired will be guaranteed the right of access to the High Court to determine
the amount of compensation ... Compensation will, within a reasonable time,
be remitted to any country outside Zimbabwe, free from any deduction, tax or
charge in respect of its remission ... " (Stiff, 2000: 288).
To summarise:
• 20 parliamentary seats reserved to give white minority a forum for a period
of 10 years.
• An equitable redistribution of land to the landless.
• Willing buyer, willing seller clause
• Compensated in foreign currency
• Formation of ZNA
Although the Lancaster House Agreement stipulated certain prerequisites for
the newly elected government, Hodder-Williams (1980: 107) argued that the
new government's priorities were dominated by the consequences of the
guerrilla war. This was confirmed with Mugabe's Independence Speech when
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he assured the nation of "land for the landless, homes for the homeless,
schools for the children, roads to transport the farmers' produce, markets at
which crops can be sold, and health facilities for the rural areas" (Hodder-
Williams, 1980: 107).
After independence the Zimbabwe government introduced the three-year
Transitional Development Plan (1983-1985), aiming to resettle at least 162
000 peasant families. This was an impossible task as it required more than
Z$570 million to relocate those families. The government soon decided to
scale down on its goals and proposed the First Five-Year National
Development Plan (1986-1990). Herbst (1991: 270) stated that during this
time the number of families resettled had risen to a figure of 52 000. It was
decided that the 162 000 family goal would be an eventual target for the entire
resettlement effort.
Initially the resettlement scheme in Zimbabwe were divided into a number of
models, including Models A, B, C and D. Peter et al (2000: 154) stated that,
Model A schemes consisted of household village-type resettlements of five
arable hectares (ha) and 15 grazing ha each; Model B was based on a
collective co-operation model; Model C and D schemes consisted of
respectively 10 ha plots attached to a state farm, and villages with arable but
no grazing land. The resettiers on the most popular model, Model A, received
permits form the Ministry of Land on a household basis to reside, cultivate and
graze stock. However, the household must relinquish its land in the
communal areas and reside in the resettlement area.
Ten years after the Lancaster House Agreement, the Zimbabwe Parliament
passed a revised Bill of Rights on 12 December 1990. The new provisions
allowed government to confiscate land and pay 'fair' compensation purchased
through administrative price setting, irrespective of the willingness of the
sellers. Matshe (2000: 24) believed that the way forward would be to draft a
new Constitution in light of the fact that although the Lancaster House
Constitution is still the legal Constitution, it has lost its political and moral
authority.
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3.3 THE LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1992
The Land Acquisition Act of 1992 marked a turning point for land reform in
Zimbabwe. The rationale behind this Act was to seize land and to allocate the
acquired land to black farmers. Moyo (1995: 3) believed that the act and
government's defensive stance on land reform was a "formal statement of
recognition ...that the first decade and a half of land reform was far from
satisfactory for various segments of society". The main reason for this
assessment was that government did not fulfill the transparency requirements
of the Lancaster House Agreements. Initially many observers viewed the Act
as a liberal market-orientated approach to land reform, in light of the fact that
it rejects land occupations and land claims. The land acquisition will be
"compulsory for reasons of public good and the Act provides for fair
compensation" (Moyo, 1995: 13).
It became clear by the beginning of the 1990's that Zimbabwe was facing a
crisis concerning land use i.e. agricultural, environmental and land allocation.
Chitiyo (2000: 15) stated that the Zimbabwean government introduced the
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) to address the above-
mentioned problems. The ESAP was designed by the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and aimed to "deregulate and indebt an
economy seen as overprotected and inefficient" (Bond et ai, 2002: xv). The
Zimbabwean government announced that there would be a "25 % cut in civil
service, along with the demise of all labour restrictions, price controls, and
import regulations, as well as many government subsidies" (Bond et ai, 2002:
31). Bond et al (2002: 31) reported that the Mugabe government promised
the following benefits:
• 5 % growth annually.
• The overall budget deficit would shrink to 5 % of GOP.
• Foreign debt would increase from US$2.4 billion in 1991 to a projected
US$4 billion in 1995. However, repaying the debt would be
significantly easier.
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• The debt service ratio, which peaked at 35 % in 1987, would fall to 18.5
% by 1995.
• Private sector investment would be doubled.
• Total invest would increase to 25 % from less than 20 % of GOP from
1985-1990.
• Inflation would be down from 20 % to 10 % by 1994.
• Mining exports would increase from less than US$400 million in 1990
to more than US$500 million in 1994.
• Would initiate better more competitive terms for trade.
• New direct investments would flood to Zimbabwe-US$ 30 million a year
from 1992-1995.
However, the ESAP failed, primarily due to the fact that its "implementation
coincided with the drought of 1990-1993" (Chitiyo, 2000: 15). The effects of
the programme resulted in inflation and high prices, higher level of
unemployment and aggravated rural problems. However, the Zimbabwean
government succeeded to abolish "18 000 government jobs, reducing the civil
service bill form 15.3 % to 11.3 % in 1994 of the GOP" (Bond et ai, 2002: 37).
The World Bank Project Completion Report (1995) judged the progress of
ESAP as highly satisfactory, contrasting public opinion in Zimbabwe.
The government argued that the new land reform policy was created to
guarantee access of land to small-scale African farmers and aspiring black
capitalists. The white farmers did not react favourably to the Land Acquisition
Act. The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) recognised the need for the
redistribution of land but called upon the government to reconsider as
"commercial agriculture, ... accounted for one-quarter of all jobs and 40
percent of export earning"(Meredith, 2002: 122) and that forcing farmers off
their land without adequate compensation could be detrimental to the
Zimbabwe economy. They proposed that government should either start
redistributing the half million acres of government owned land but their
suggestions was negatively received by Mugabe and his government.
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After the inception of the Land Acquisition Act government designated thirteen
productive farms for land reform purposes. Again in 1993, 70 farms, several
owned by government's political opponents were claimed. Meredith (2002:
124) stated that government action aroused suspicions that the land
acquisition programme was being used to settle old political scores.
Furthermore, the Land Acquisition Act soon aroused criticism against it. It
was proven that a 3,000-acre farm purchased by the government to
redistribute to 33 landless peasants was given to the former agriculture
minister,Witness Mangwende.
3.4 THE WAR VETERANS ASSOSIATION, 1989-
After independence in 1980 the war veterans were forgotten and government
neglected to provide them employment and land, which was the underlying
objective of the armed struggle. The war veterans were disillusioned due to
the fact that Mugabe and senior officials of Zanu-PF prospered after
independence. Stiff (2000: 316) reports that members of the Zimbabwean
National War Veterans Association, were demobilised after independence
instead of being absorbed into the National Army, one of the preconditions of
the Lancaster House Agreement. However, the war veterans were offered
demobilisation packages of Z$185 per month for a period of two years till
1981.
Moyo (1995: 115) stated that the War Veterans Act of 1992 officially promised
ex-combatants access to land but most of the war veterans remained
unemployed and poverty stricken. In 1997 independent MP Margaret Dongo,
inquired why more than $1.5 billion have been paid between 1992 and 1997
and still war veterans were not reaping the fruits of the settlement. Dongo,
accused the government and more specifically Chenjerai Hunzvi, chair of the
War Veterans Association, that only senior politicians, officials and their
relatives benefited from the money that was allocated towards the war
veterans. Furthermore, it was difficult to say who were "truly war veterans
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and who were imposters because [during] the Bush War days no record was
kept" (Stiff, 2000: 316). As early as March 2000 Hunzvi was directly
implicated in the fraudulent transaction of about "Z$3 million from Zexcom, a
company owned by the War Veterans Association" (Stiff, 2000: 242). Mugabe
turned a blind eye to the allegations due to the fact that Hunzvi and the war
veterans was aiding his land reform programme.
The War Veterans and land issue was a great embarrassment for Mugabe
and ministers and critics believed that he vented his frustration and anger
towards the white farmers. Meredith (2002: 138-139) reported that
government decided to take 12 million acres of land from white farmers for
redistribution to blacks. Mugabe declared, "the only payment the government
would make would be for buildings and for what he termed infrastructural
development like roads and dams, but nothing for the soil itself' (Meredith,
2002: 139). Furthermore, Mugabe boldly stated that Britain as a former
colonial power could compensate the white farmers. The war veterans and
youths were incorporated in the police and selective prosecution became the
norm as Zanu-PF supporters engaged in political violence.
In 1997 Mugabe restored the prominence of the War Veterans Association
and in turn they "became Mugabe's shock troops after the February 2000
referendum defeat, invading more than 1 500 white-owned farms" (Bond et ai,
2002: 77). They allowed Mugabe to claim that only Zanu-PF could restore
Zimbabwe's land inequality. The government announced that they would give
a payment of Z$50 000 plus Z$2 000 per month to a total of 50 000 liberation
war veterans. However, Bond (2002: 39) reports that the war veterans
encountered resentment from the rest of society as income tax and petrol tax
were increased to cover the payments they received. Furthermore, Mugabe
and Hunzvi planned a national farm invasion campaign using the War
Veterans Association after having decided that they were needed for this
exercise. The war veterans were offered a "pension increase of 41 %" (Stiff,
2000: 327) to win their trust and respect. Observers considered it as payment
to drive white settlers of their farms.
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3.5 LAND INVASIONS: MARCH 2000
Bond et al (2002: 77) argued that land occupation began in February 2000 as
a direct response to the humiliation that Mugabe suffered after the
referendum. This gave rise to intensified land invasions; although a few
peasants and farm workers invaded land during 1997-1998, authorities
cleared them off. The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), "a non-racial body
representing the country's 4 500 commercial farmer" (Stiff, 2000: 337)
appealed to government to reconsider their draft constitution as it would
undermine Zimbabwe's already battered image and deepen its worst
economic crisis. However, the government responded that the land invasions
would only be stop if white land owners willingly handover their land to the
government. Mugabe claimed that the land invasions were not a
governmental exercise but the war veterans expressing a legitimate concern
for fair land redistribution. He announced on 27 March 2000 that he had no
intention as to intervene in the matter. He described the land invasions as
peaceful demonstrations and claimed that government did not encourage or
fuelled the movement. It was reported that the armed gangs were transported
by government and army trucks to the various farms to be seized.
Meredith (2002: 167) argued that these armed forces called themselves war
veterans, while a large number were unemployed youths who were paid a
daily allowance to peg out plots of land and to crush any support for the
opposition. Some war veteran groups only caused disruption to normal
agricultural activities, while others used more aggressive and violent tactics.
Furthermore, the war veterans threatened if the opposition would win the
upcoming election they would make Zimbabwe ungovernable. The CFU
obtained a High Court order on March 17 2000, which declared, "land
invasions to be illegal and instructing the police to evict the invaders within
twenty-four hours" (Meredith, 2002: 170). The high ranking political figures
and police ignored this High Court order and land invasions intensified.
Normal agricultural practices were harshly sabotaged by war veterans, who
had gone to great lengths to stop farmers to deliver any produce.
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Stiff (2000: 344) reported that the presidential spokesperson, George
Charamba, announced that the president "would not halt the invasions until
Parliament had amended the constitution to allow the acquisition of land
without compensation". Mugabe reasoned that if the British government
neglected to honour their Lancaster House Agreement of paying half the cost
for redistribution purposes, the Zimbabwe government would continue to take
white-owned land without compensation.
The Zimbabwe government intensified media laws, sympathetic towards
Zanu-PF and subtly intimidated voters to ensure that Mugabe remains in the
leadership position. The general election of June 2002 was relatively calm,
although the opposition reported incidences of intimidation. The election
results showed that "Zanu-PF won sixty-two seats, obtaining 48 percent of the
votes cast; MDC won fifty-seven seats, obtaining 47 percent" (Meredith, 2002:
188). Leader of the MDC, Morgan Tsvangirai, attempted to contest the
results of election in court due to the various cases of intimidation and
irregularities concerning the counting of the ballots.
The election results was an indication to Mugabe that the MDC was a force to
be reckoned with as they only have been in existence nine months prior the
election and still successfully contended with Zanu-PF. Shortly after the
election, Mugabe announced, The Third Chimurenga, a campaign that would
finally free Zimbabwe from its colonial heritage. However, Meredith (2002:
191) argued that the campaign was only intensified episodes of violence and
intimidation against the electorate to ensure that Mugabe retained his power.
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3.6 DONORS
The Lancaster House Agreement constituted that Britain would contribute
financially half of what is needed to successfully redistribute land to the
landless in Zimbabwe. After they have funded more than 44 million pounds,
resulting in the acquisition of about 3,5 million hectares of commercial farm
land for resettlement, it was discovered that the programme was plagued by
mismanagement and corruption. During the early 1990's the United States of
America described the land reform programme in Zimbabwe as racial, linking
the unwillingness to provide resources to facilitate land redistribution.
From as early as Independence, Zimbabwe was pressured by businessmen,
economists and international bodies, such as the World Bank, to create a
more positive investor friendly environment. The IMF and World Bank
suspended its aid to Zimbabwe arguing "Mugabe's Zanu-PF movement,
ruined a once-vibrant economy in 21 years of mismanagement, ... merely
using land as a major campaign tool" (Mapenzauswa, 2001: 2). Peters &
Malan (2000: 156) argued that the cancelling of international funding of land
reform in Zimbabwe enraged Mugabe, who started to threaten to expropriate
white-owned commercial agricultural land without compensation.
Furthermore, the IMF gave no target date for a resumption of aid, which was
frozen in 1999 over issues including Zimbabwe's involvement in the Congo
war, and the forced land invasions of white farms without any compensation.
Currently, Zimbabwe is showing the first signs of starvation, while Mugabe
alienated foreign investors cutting off access to foreign currency needed to
import food. Itano (2001: 1) stated that during the World Conference Against
Racism held in South Africa developing countries demanded acknowledgment
that colonialism left a legacy of racism, which directly contributed, to
landlessness problem in Africa. Countries like Zimbabwe indicated that the
only solution would be reparation or aid by the former colonies.
47
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.7. SUMMARY
Today, Zimbabwe faces the painful reality that its political revolutions have
only brought them halfway to true independence. Regarding the land
question, Moyo (1995: 1) stated that years after independence, the
government failed to address key public concerns, which was: "the adequacy
of the quantity and quality of land redistributed, the method and costs of land
acquisition and redistribution, the efficiency of land use in both the large farm
and resettlement areas, the suitability of those benefiting form land
redistribution, the fairness and equitability of procedures for dealing, with land
demands, and the economic impact of land reform". However, Chitiyo (2000:
4) stresses the fact that settlers did not alone generate Zimbabwe's land
problem, but that numerous land wars between the Shona and Ndebele
contributed to it and that these conflicts should be negotiated.
Mugabe's objective for Zimbabwe was to establish a Marxist-Leninist
dispensation where decision making on all "crucial matters would be under
political control in order to bring about the drastic redistribution of wealth from
whites to blacks and to become independent form capitalists" (Leistner, 1989:
147). However, Zimbabwe did not and would not succeed with a functioning
socialist economy, as history already revealed to us. Walsh (2002: 1)
reported that of the remaining 4, 500 white farmer, 2,900 have been informed
by government to evacuate their land without compensation. Government
policies and regulations created a chronic shortage of food supplies in
Zimbabwe. Still they continued refusing white farmers to proceed in food
production.
The importance of land in Zimbabwe did not so much lie in the inequalities,
but rather the inability to access land, accompanied by a growing
overpopulation, landlessness, land deterioration and escalating poverty in the
black areas parallel with severe under-utilisation of land in the white farming
areas. This set the stage for conflict. Government needs to admit that they
do not have the organisational expertise to resettle people. Compagnon
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(2000: 453) remarked that the tactics and policies promoted by Mugabe and
Zanu-PF have suffered to the extent that the regime's image in the West
could never be restored.
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CHAPTER FOUR: COMPARING KENYA AND ZIMBABWE
4.1 SIMILARITIES BETWEEN KENYA AND ZIMBABWE
In Africa governmental land reform programmes have had mixed success.
The complex nature of the liberation struggles in Africa, created diverse post-
independence governmental systems therefore, indicating the difficulty to
draw similarities, as no two Land Reform Policies would be similar in their
political and economic nature. However, some former settler colonies
illustrate certain common underlying features. Years after independence land
remained the key focus of government in both Kenya and Zimbabwe (dealt
with in previous chapters) as well as in South Africa. In Zimbabwe the leading
issues are restitution and compensation and the legalities of the restoration
process while in Kenya, squatting on state land, and the lack of production on
too small units of private land, created problems for the productivity of land.
4.1.1 Backward vs. Advanced
The most observable similarity between Kenya and Zimbabwe was that both
were products of British colonialism and the colonialists' attempt to expose
dark Africa to commerce and Christianity. The colonial history of these two
countries, subsequently, greatly determined the identity of those it affected.
The Brown Commission (in Mungazi, 1992: 91) stated: In the contact sphere
between two different cultures, distrust and deeply injured feelings damaged
relationships between the government and the Africans. Horowitz (1985: 167)
in his book, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, came to the conclusion that the greater
cultural differences there is between ethnic groups, the greater the chances
would be for conflict, as both groups' objective would be to preserve their own
identity. Ethnicity is viewed as a dense, highly emotional package and that
difference between groups emerges from comparisons and competition.
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Stiff (2000: 281) stated that the European authorities successfully
indoctrinated an entire race to view Africans as inferior beings. This directly
links with Horowitz's (1985: 167) Backward vs. Advanced theory: ethnic
groups, and more so individuals, need a positive evaluation of themselves as
what you are shapes who you are. The colonial powers had a strong internal
positive evaluation of themselves, as they invidiously measured and
compared their achievements and what they have resisted to the indigenous
communities. Therefore, when the colonial powers arrived in Africa they
immediately assigned meaning to the attributes of the indigenous
communities, and in doing so, created ethnic stereotypes that produced a
basis for future conflict. The "Backward" units inevitably will target the
"Advanced" group, as they intrinsically would want to gain what the more
prosperous groups possess.
Horowitz (1985: 171) suggests three possible strategies that "Backward"
communities could incorporate to free them from their competitive
disadvantages. Firstly, they could catch-up with the advanced groups, and in
doing so abandon their culture and dismantling their own identity. Secondly,
the "Backward" units could resort to violence, to cause a sense of threat that
would upstage the "Advanced" groups. Thirdly, the "Backward" group could
attempt to capture the state by engaging into active politics. In the global
system, states are regarded as equal, however, by the promotion of symbols
and a certain language, dominance is established. In engaging the state it is
essential to dominate the civil service as its identity tells who owns the state.
The colonial history of Kenya and Zimbabwe are both excellent case studies
for this theory. The British colonised both countries during the late 1890's and
as a result of group differences and competition for land, the indigenous
communities first attempted to catch-up with the colonial powers in terms of
western education and religion. This was aided by the missionary school
systems in British colonies and the decline of traditional beliefs making way
for Christianity. However, the colonial powers were still unwilling to fully
incorporate the indigenous people into their society. The indigenous
communities where still regarded as backward and inferior and would never
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rise to the European level of civilisation. This rejection of the colonial powers
to fully accept indigenous people, even after they have forfeited their identity,
enraged the oppressed and they resorted to violent tactics to regain their
possession (land), but most importantly their self worth. This period of violent
retaliation is captured best by Mau-Mau, in Kenya, and the Chimurenga (war
of liberation) in Zimbabwe, as they exemplify the anxiety and stress of the
indigenous people. After independence, the colonial authorities were
automatically lifted out of the governing seats by products of their education
programme for the indigenous community. Indigenous people gained enough
knowledge concerning western politics, to successfully compete with their
colonial counterparts. In both case studies the insurgence of African
nationalism, and western ideological beliefs like democracy and socialism
contributed to the reclaiming of land and the regaining of a positive sense of
worth.
4.1.2 The settler community
Literature suggests that the black liberation forces did not win the two
liberation struggles in Kenya and Zimbabwe. However, the settlements
between the colonial powers and the African nationalists should be seen as
an essential part of the political solution to the war, "because the last settler
government could not have compromised unless its most important
constituency, the white farmers, were at least to some extent reassured about
their future" (Herbst, 1991: 271). This assurance in both countries was
contributed to the fact that white-farmers dominated the agricultural sector,
the leading contributor to their economies, at the time of Independence.
Although, the main objective was to redistribute land to black landless
peasants, the importance of the white commercial farmer was regarded highly
by the post-independent government. After independence in Kenya, the
Kenyatta government attempted to break the non-Kenyan hold on the
economy by imposing various restrictive measures. Still, the government was
sensitive and sympathetic to the needs of the white commercial farmers as
they were the only lifelines for Kenya after Independence. Initially, the
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Zimbabwean government regarded the colonial settlers as imperative to the
economic success of the country, as they contributed more than 75 % of the
domestic food supply. However, in recent times Mugabe and his government
took on a different stance on the need for a settler community in Zimbabwe as
they regard the need to redistribute land more important than the production
of domestic food supplies, which white commercial farmer still dominates 22
years after independence.
4.1.3 Nepotism and corruption
The liberation struggles in Kenya and Zimbabwe focused on the release of
freedom fighters and the reclaiming of land. Promises where made that after
independence land would be freely distributed to all landless peasants.
However, in both cases the land reform programmes created the opportunity
for corruption, as political elites became landlords, crushing the hopes of the
peasants to gain access to possible land. In Kenya, Kenyatta consolidated
his power by favouring an "informal system of nepotism and favouritism"
(Miller et ai, 1994: 37) as land was given as reward to politicians, officials and
relatives. The levels of corruption in Zimbabwe were more severe compared
to Kenya. Among the transactions was a 3,OOO-acre farm purchased by the
government to redistribute to 33 landless peasants but was given to the
former agriculture minister, Witness Mangwende. The British Government
discovered after spending more than 44 billion pounds on the redistribution,
peasants were still landless and poverty stricken.
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4.2 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KENYA AND ZIMBABWE
4.2.1 Liberation struggle
The liberation struggle in Kenya was mainly about land and the release of
Jomo Kenyatta. The nature of the Mau-Mau rebellion in Kenya (1952-1957)
insured that the British government created a Settlement Fund after
independence, to be used by Kenyans to purchase land and furthermore, to
benefit the entire population. In Zimbabwe, African Nationalism and the
liberation war was still highly politicised years after independence. Mugabe
used the land question and liberation movement to win sympathy for the
Zanu-PF party, while in Kenya; Jomo Kenyatta urged the nation to forget the
Mau-Mau liberation struggle in order to heal.
The Chimurenga (war of liberation) in Zimbabwe (1966-1979) was not only
about power and majority rule, but also about land. The Lancaster House
Agreement of 1979, stipulated that the British government would contribute
half of what was needed to successfully redistribute land in Zimbabwe.
However, it could be stated that the Land Policy in Kenya succeeded by
benefiting many displaced Kenyanswhile the settlement process in Zimbabwe
was detrimental to the economy and agricultural section. This was mainly due
to the fact that nowhere else in post-independence societies, land reform
were characterised by violent uprising. In Zimbabwe, the War Veterans
Association, assisted government with illegal land invasions in March 2000
and was responsible for the destruction of the economy.
Peters & Malan (2000: 155-156) states that land reform is a very costly and
lengthy process. Therefore, the development of former colonies relies heavily
on financial assistance, especially aiding with the restoration aspect of their
various land restitution programmes. In 2000 the Zimbabwean Government
estimated that the land reform programme would cost more than $1 billion, as
it also included the cost of support services to ensure sustainability. History
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indicates that the land reform success in Kenya could be directly linked to the
Settlement Fund, which the British Government created to assist the newly
elected independent government over an extended period of time. In
Zimbabwe financial aid was suspended in light of the fact that the aid was not
reaching whom it was intended for. The Zimbabwean model clearly indicated
that without donor assistance the entire land reform programme and economy
came to an abrupt halt. Furthermore, donor aid could be beneficial for a
country like Zimbabwe, where "state land represents only 1 % of all land in the
country" (DUA, 2001: 105), having in effect no state land available for
redistributive purposes.
4.2.2 African Socialism
Theorists suggested that the success of strategies and principles after
independence relied heavily on government's stance on socialism. The
Kenyan Government "laid down a Sessional Paper No 10 of 1965, entitled
African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya" (Ogot et ai, 1995:
83). This document indicated that government rejected both Western
capitalism and Eastern communism. Kenyatta was once quoted stating that
communism was just as bad as colonialism. Ogot et al (1995: 84) stated that
the main features of African Socialism in Kenya included:
• Political democracy.
• Mutual social and political responsibility.
• Various forms of property ownership so that nobody would have too much
power.
• The control of wealth so that it is used in the interest of society.
• Freedom from want, disease and exploitation.
• Progressive taxation to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor.
The Kenyan model of Socialism rather attempted to build upon and modify the
political and economic system they inherited from the colonial powers.
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Kenyatta gladly encouraged foreign investment although some factions of
society called for scientific socialism.
In Zimbabwe, the ruling party "acknowledged Marxism-Leninism as its ruling
ideology, and proclaimed an ongoing transition to socialism, but operates an
economy in which private, not to say foreign, capital is dominant" (Stoneman,
1988: 6). These two contradicting elements were regarded, as the lack of
political will of government to implement radical policies. The Marxist
overtone of the Zimbabwean regime "attracted top-up aid with no conditions
attached or questions asked" (Stiff, 2000: 313) from the Communist Bloc.
However, after 1990, aid from the Communist Bloc was suspended forcing
Zimbabwe to turn its focus on the West for financial assistance.
4.2.3 Kenyatta vs. Mugabe
The legacy of leadership is crucial to any post-independence government as it
determines the direction of the future. Maloba (1998: 157) argued that
Kenyatta was truly regarded as the Light of Kenya, and the history of the
liberation struggle and Kenyatta's name is linked to the country. Although
Kenyatta distanced himself from the Mau-Mau, this movement took its killing
oath, when he was arrested. Although Kenyatta adopted a divided nationalist
movement it became clear that he provided the leadership that could unify the
nationalist movement in Kenya and he forced the pace of nationalism in
Kenya. The leadership of Jomo Kenyatta created a legacy of stability and
prosperity for Kenya.
The leadership of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle was fragmented to the
degree that certain factions support certain personalities. Robert Mugabe had
his Mashonaland support base firmly rooted in the Zanu party, although it
should be noted that he only "gained the control of the army and the party as
late as August 1977" (Meredith, 2002: 37). Observers suggests that the only
reason Mugabe was chosen to lead the liberation struggle to independence
was because he opted for more violent tactics compared to his moderate
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colleagues, who were not inclined to some forms of violence. Mugabe's
method of governance in Zimbabwe has damaged the image of the country,
which could not be restored.
4.2.4 Negotiability of goods
The article of Albin (1991: 45), concerning the nature to what extent indivisible
goods can be negotiated in Jerusalem, could be implemented to discuss the
nature of indivisible goods (land) in Zimbabwe. She stated that economic
conflict is easily negotiable, but that the nature of the goods determined if it
was divisible or indivisible. However, in the case of Zimbabwe, land could be
regarded as an indivisible good as it is a commodity so unique that it cannot
be replaced or multiplied and by subdividing it will loose its meaning and
intrinsic qualities. Furthermore, people attached meaning and value to the
land and by dividing it could loose its commercial value.
In Zimbabwe one party within an electoral democracy has absolute power
making it difficult to negotiate, as smaller parties are not seen as equal.
Negotiating a fair exchange concerning the land is not attainable, as land is
viewed at a zero sum payoff. This indicates what the one party loses (white
commercial farmers) the other party gains (Zanu-PF).
Albin (1991: 53) suggested that the only solution to answer the land question
would be if people could modify their perception and unlearn the value of land,
because behavioural change could alter the nature of the goods. However,
Horowitz (1985: 184) believed that contest shapes ethnic and cultural identity
and if there were a breakdown in animosity there would be a breakdown of
identity. Thus, suggesting that some conflicts are non-negotiatable.
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4.3 LESSONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA
The South African government's objective concerning land restitution is to
bridge the racial ownership gap in land or be held responsible for future social
instability. The right to own land is both emotionally and economically
important and government's greatest concern at present is to prevent a land
hunger situation in South Africa just as great as in Zimbabwe. International
experience (e.g. Zimbabwe and Kenya) attests to the fact that in countries
undergoing a transition to democracy, land is often a "mechanism used to
mediate the dialectics of reconciliation and transition over and above the need
to effect meaningful and radical agrarian transformation" (Kariuki, 2000: 1).
Thus, the deliverance rate of the ruling party will be a test to measure their
competence.
The Land Reform Programme in South Africa consists of three legs that were
put in place to improve overall welfare and to alleviate poverty in the country.
Land restitution usually involves "returning land lost, or compensating victims
who lost property since 19 June 1913" (Matlou, 2000: 1) as a result of racially
discriminatory laws or practices, and without just and equitable compensation,
at the time of dispossession. Land redistribution enables the "poor and
disadvantaged people in South Africa to buy land with the help of
Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant/Land Redistribution for Agricultural
Development Sub-Programmes (LRAD)" (DUA, 2001: 76). The land tenure
reform aims to privatise state-owned land in order to bring all people
occupying land under one legal system of landholding. It aims to provide help
to "resolve tenure disputes and provide alternatives for people who are
displaced in the process" (DUA, 2001: 76).
The Department of Land Affairs is the leading coordinators and monitor of the
land reform policy programmes. However, their budget and staff are divided
to facilitate the following functions: surveys and mapping, deeds registration,
the Surveyor-General and land development planning, the management of
state land falling under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Agriculture and Land
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Affairs. The Directorate of Department of Land Affairs is responsible for the
overall coordination, training and support, as well as macro programme and
policy evaluation of the various Land Reform Programmes. While the
Provincial directors are responsible for monitoring and evaluation at provincial
level. However, many critics regard the monitoring and evaluation of the three
programmes as the key to the blocked and slow land reform in South Africa.
Land Restitution is regarded the most important programme of the entire Land
Reform process as it "gives all South Africans the opportunity to share the
country and its resources" (Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, 2002:
9). The Chief land claims commissioner regards it as a more sustainable and
lasting basis for reconciliation. Furthermore, Land Restitution holds the key to
local economic development, both urban and rural areas, and ultimately to the
growth of the national GOP. The remainder of this chapter will be dedicated
to investigate whether the Restitution Programme fulfil the promises made in
the Constitution.
Chief land claims commissioner, Wallace Mgoqi (in Commission of Restitution
of Land Rights, 2002: 9), stated that the Restitution of Land Rights, as a
process, is aimed at rectifying the injustices of the past and has its origins in
the interim constitution of 1993. The historical background of South Africa
suggests that more than 3.5 million people and their descendants have been
victims of racially based dispossessions and forced removals during the
apartheid years. The Groups Areas Act or the Urban Areas Act contributed to
the large number of urban removals. The Rural removals consisted of various
categories, such as black spot removals and removal of labour tenants. The
Black Land Act NO.2? of 1913, the Development Trust and Land Act NO.18 of
1936 and the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act NO.52 of 1951 constituted the
removals of mission stations, removals for the sake of forestry requirements
and internal removals in the scheduled and released areas (later to become
the homelands).
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The Commission on Restitution of Land Rights (in Commission on Restitution
of Land Rights, 2002: 2) leading task is aligning their vision, mission and
values to honour the promise of the Constitution of South Africa.
VISION
"To have persons or communities, dispossessed of property after 19 June
1913 as a result of past racial discriminatory laws and practices, restored to
such property or receive just and equitable redress" (Commission on
Restitution of Land Rights, 2002: 2).
MISSION
• "To promote equity for victims of dispossession by the state, particularly
the landless and rural poor.
• To facilitate development by bringing together all stakeholders relevant to
land claims.
• To promote reconciliation through the restitution process.
• To contribute towards an equitable redistribution of land rights"
(Commission on Restitution on Land Rights, 2002: 2).
VALUES
• "Promotion of gender equity.
• Just and equitable redress.
• Prioritising the needs of land development.
• Needs-based prioritisation.
• Promotion of Batho-Pele" (Commission on Restitution of Land Rights,
2002: 2).
The property clause in the new Constitution seeks to achieve a balance
between the protections of current property rights and constitutional
guarantees of land reform. This is a double challenge for government, as it
must unlock historical structural constraints. The White Paper on South
African Land Policy sets the framework for land reform for both rural and
urban areas in South Africa.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
61
The Land Policy strive to deal with the following:
• "The injustice of racially based land dispossession.
• The inequitable distribution of land ownership.
• The need for security of tenure for all.
• The need for sustainable use of land.
• The need for rapid release of land for development.
• The need to record and register all rights in property.
• The need to administer public land in an effective manner" (DUA, 2001:
76).
The total estimated land surface of South Africa constitutes to 1 219090 km2
(Streek, 2000: 1), of which the Province breakdown is listed in Table 1, and
the South African Government is the biggest landowner. Thoko Didiza (in
Streek, 2000: 1), current Minister of Land Affairs, confirmed that the state
owns 24,3-million hectares of land (Table 1), which constitutes about 20% of
the total surface area (Table 2). This figure includes governmental
departments such as SANDF, SAPS and others as listed in Table 3, but
excludes vast tracks of land, that constitutes more than 8% (Table 2) of the
surface area, owned by parastatals like Transnet and the 2,9-million hectares
owned by the Ingonyama Trust in KwaZulu-Natal. This figure also excludes
"unsurveyed and unregistered state owned land such as coastal areas,
foreign properties such as South African embassies, offshore islands such as
Robben Island, land held in trust by the State such as former Coloured Rural
areas, parastatalland such Eskom and land leased for state domestic or other
national purposes" (Streek, 2000: 2).
Didiza (in Streek, 2000: 2) agreed with the former minister of agriculture and
land affairs, Derek Hanekom, that only 1.3-million hectares of state-owned
land (5 %) are suitable and available for land reform purposes. However, the
availability of state-owned land suitable for restitution purposes could have a
positive impact on the entire Land Reform Policy, as it could provide land for
redistributive purposes. The Chief Land Claims Commissioner, adv. Wallace
A. Mgoqi (Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, 2002: 8), believed that
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their ultimate goal should be that land restitution be measured not by the
number of claims settled, but by the success of the projects on the restored
land. However, in the beginning of 2002, the President in his state of the
Nation Address acknowledged that the number of settled claims had risen
from 12,094 (number of claims settled at the end of 2001) to just over 29,000.
Total
Public companies/parastatals
Table 1: Province breakdown of land surface in South Africa
Table 2: Percentage land surface owned by the South African government.
Former homelands 13.8 %
Eastern Cape 6.1 million ha
Northern Province 5.3 million ha
North West 3.9 million ha
KwaZulu-Natal 1.9 million ha
Mpumalanga 2.4 million ha
Western Cape 1.9 million ha
Northern Cape 1.7 million ha
Free State 635776 ha
Gauteng 429670 ha
Total 24.3 million ha
*sou rce-Streek,2000.
National parks
Provincial parks
Trust and forestry land
2.9%
2.6%
1%
20.3%
*source-Streek,2000.
8.3%
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Table 3: Hectares of land owned by governmental departments.
SANDF
-Northern Cape
SAPS
Department of Correctional Services
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry
Department of Agriculture
South African National Parks
-Provincial
Department of PublicWorks
Department of HomeAffairs, Justice, Mineral and Energy
Experimental Farms.
*source-Streek,2000
43632
254812
40145
84335
758780
86694
3354300
3138669
2 133300
4.4 A Critique of current Land Restitution Programme
During the inception of the Land Reform Pilot Programmes in 1995, it was
noted that the institutional capacity of the Department of Land Affairs would
not be able to hold the demand of land claims. The lack of staff became a
source of major concern as the public demand for land reform increased. The
current, 2400, Department of Land Affairs staff members is divided between
various projects other than land reform. More that three-quarters are
engaged in the vital survey and deeds registration services and corporate
services of the Department. Only "447 posts, both on national and provincial
level, are available for land reform policy development" (Department of Land
Affairs, 1997: 7) and registration. Until 1996 only 304 of these posts were
filled.
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4.4.1 Institutional capacity
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4.4.2 Land invasions
The invasion and illegal occupation of land is a threat to stability and
development to any evolving democracy. In South Africa, community groups
have found their land planning and housing development on identified land
brought to a halt by land invaders. This is directly linked to the level of
poverty and desperation in South Africa. A survey by the World Bank on
Persistence of Poverty in Rural South Africa (1995) showed that 57 % of all
households in the rural areas are poor, and 68,3 % of people in rural
households live in poverty. Of the total poor in the country, 60,6 % are
Africans and only 0,7 % are white. It should be mentioned that the interest in
land is not simply for residential purposes, but for a substantial minority, in
addition to being a place to live, land has a productive value to alleviate
poverty.
The big question lurking is whether South Africa could avoid the Zimbabwe
land experience? Initially the claims settled by the commission were very
slow. This was mainly due to the fact that form 1995 until 1998 all claims
lodged had to be ratified by Court, even where there was an agreement
between the parties. Furthermore, the roles of the Commission and the
Department of Land Affairs overlapped and resulted in duplication and long
delays. Mgoqi (in Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, 2002: 9) views
the amendment of the Restitution Act during 1998 positively, as it vested the
Minister with powers to finalise claims administratively. This contributed to an
increase in the settlement of claims.
The Land Claims Commission concludes that the recent developments in
restitution, aided this programme immensely. They include:
• "Implementing the Standard Settlement Offer policy, which has worked
well so far, and has enabled CRLR to avoid lengthy and costly valuations.
• Implementing the policy of Betterment Claims, as has been done with the
approval by the Minister in the Chatha claim, Eastern Cape, and is to be
rolled out in similar claims.
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• Implementing policy on labour Tenancy, and submission of claims to the
Minister for approval in terms of Section 42D of the Restitution Act. This
too will fast track the restitution of claims.
• Achieving an integrated working relationship between the Commission and
the Department of land Affairs over the current financial year, thus
creating synergies beneficial to the restitution process.
• Establishing closer working relationships with local government structures
and district councils, through district forums.
• Making vigorous use of the administrative approach- i.e. negotiated
settlements.
• Referring disputed claims to the land Claims Court.
• Expropriating, as a matter of last resort, under the rule of law. This
emphasises the fact that the preferred method of settling restitution claims
is by means of negotiated settlements, which result in win-win outcomes
for all involved" (DUA, 2001: 80).
4.5 SUMMARY
The political survival of the South African Government depends on the ability
to correct past racial imbalances and to transform the economy. However,
land Reform should be seen a long-term programme with no quick-fix
solutions. The South African land Reform Programmes have increasingly
drawn international attention, because much has been achieved in a varied,
innovative and comprehensive way in a short space of time and without
international donor aid.
Broad similarities between Zimbabwe and South Africa exist, especially the
need for land. Peter & Malan (2000: 157) state that research on land demand
and migration patterns in South Africa indicate that more than 67,7 % of black
rural households has a need for land. The South African government must
acquire land on a willing seller basis and must pay just compensation for that
land. However, observers to the Zimbabwe crisis predict that this could inhibit
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the amount of land acquired in the future. Khumalo (2002: 1) reports that the
Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs, Thoko Didiza, announced that
government are negotiating the possibility to impose legislation to decrease
the foreign ownership of land in South Africa. Furthermore, she assured
South Africans that white and black commercial farmers in South Africa are
working together unlike the happenings in Zimbabwe. Structures like Agri SA
assists government to attract black farmers to this sector.
Opposition parties in South Africa, like the UDM, believe that South Africans
should emancipate themselves from the black/white ideological way of
thinking. Bantu Holomisa (in Rapport, 2002: September 1) claims that
Zimbabwe did not succeed to cultivate a non-racial society and thought
patterns remained of the wealthy white farmer compared to the poor, landless
black peasant. South Africa could avoid following the same route as
Zimbabwe by honouring the constitution and to admit that every population
group and individual could contribute politically and economically.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
The British Empire was the last of the great world empires, with the most
extensive history. Furthermore, it is believed that its decline and fall took
place within a single generation, effectively beginning with Indian
Independence in 1947 and ending with the creation of Zimbabwe in 1980.
The British Government annexed vast areas of Africa for the British Crown
and their rivalry with other European powers often led to land being acquired
by unlawful means. The British justified colonisation as a moral obligation to
civilise dark Africa. Those who suffered viewed colonisation as the
exploitation of human and other resources therefore, claiming that
colonisation only financially benefited the British Government.
The theme of the study was to investigate two former British colonies, Kenya
and Zimbabwe, to determine whether colonialism created certain land
ownership patterns that had detrimental effects on the political and economic
arena after independence of these two colonies. The study concluded that
the two countries illustrated a limited number of similarities and boundless
differences concerning the history and environment, which created their
individual Land Reform Policies.
Similarities between Kenya and Zimbabwe:
• British colonies annexed in late 1890's
• Land ownership was pivotal in the political evolution of these countries
• Land remained highly politicised years after Independence
• Colonial powers created a Backward vs. Advanced mentality
• Both involved in violent, brutal liberation struggles
• Economy is dependent on the agricultural sector
• White settler community owning the commercial agricultural sector
• Years after Independence large number of landless black peasants
• Land reform plagued by nepotism and corruption
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Differences between Kenya and Zimbabwe:
KENYA ZIMBAMWE
Land reform in Kenya created Mugabe used the land
to reduce poverty and to be question to win support for
beneficial to the entire Zanu-PF
population
British financial aid for a British aid suspended due to
period of five years in Kenya corruption
Kenya's Socialism rejected Zimbabwe attempted to
both western capitalism and incorporate Marxism-
eastern communism but Leninism as its ideology, but
invited foreign investment never accomplished
Kenyatta: legacy of stability Mugabe: legacy of corruption
and prosperity and violence
Land in Kenya was Land in Zimbabwe is non-
negotiatable; resulted in negotiatable; resulted in land
settlement with a durable reform crisis
nature
Problems facing South Africa:
The South African Government estimates that more than 3,5 million people
and their descendants have been victims of racially based dispossessions
and forced removals during the apartheid years. The aim of the Restitution
programme is to rectify the injustices of the past without ever deviating to a
Zimbabwe model. Although South Africa is receiving international attention,
congratulating the Restitution Programme for the progress it has made in
successfully settling claims, studies show that more than 67,7 % of rural
South Africans is in desperate need of land.
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After a peaceful transition in Namibia and relative economic stability, pres.
Sam Nujoma is threatening the whites in the country with similar tactics like
Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, to seize land without compensation. This is
mainly due to the fact that Africa is facing a new dilemma; the fight for land is
no longer paramount but the fight for valuable land have taken center stage.
This raises the question whether South Africa, with its highly developed
constitution, and a constitutional court, which protects land rights, will not
follow the same route.
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